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FIFTY REPUBLICS AND THE NATIONAL
POPULAR VOTE: HOW THE GUARANTEE
CLAUSE SHOULD PROTECT STATES
STRIVING FOR EQUAL PROTECTION IN
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s American representative democracy is a story of epic
proportion, centuries in the making, told at the expense of countless
martyrs carrying forth the Promethean torch that lights the way of
progress. Revolutionaries, writers, heroes working the Underground
Railroad, daring statesmen, courageous women, and many others have
together sacrificed for and contributed to the ideal that is universal
suffrage. The Tree of Liberty has borne fruit that can be seen and heard
throughout the land. From the Liberty Bell and Lady Liberty to children
reciting “[L]iberty and justice for all!”, it is our shared belief that “We
hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that
they are endowed, by their CREATOR, with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.”1 Ours
is an amazing story because we, the people of the world’s arguably
greatest nation in all of history, choose our leader. The leader of not only
the United States of America, but of the “Free World,” is elected by the
people! Maybe the words have been said so often that they have lost
their full import, but “leader of the free world” is an amazing concept.
That this position is not filled through divine right, by conquest, or by
aristocratic appointment is a historical anomaly.
How amazing the path is that took the world from feudalism and
monarchy to freedom and this moment, where the people of the United
States collectively vote, as one people, for the President. And who is the
President but the only official that represents the entire American
people, each and every one of us regardless of gender, color, or place of
birth; why should we not vote directly for her and have our votes
counted directly for her?2 Through the outstanding principle of equal
protection, women and minorities share in making such a monumental
decision as who their leader will be, something that is nothing less than
an exercise in personal freedom. It cannot be said enough—this kind of
freedom is a historical abnormality!
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
See Tom Wicker, Foreword to NEAL R. PEIRCE, THE PEOPLE’S PRESIDENT: THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND THE DIRECT-VOTE ALTERNATIVE 9, 13
(1968) (echoing this same sentiment).
1
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The only problem is that this story is a bit fictional.
Through the Constitution, states—not people—reserve the power of
collectively choosing, by their electoral votes, who will become the
President.3 For many years, states have chosen through their legislative
bodies to hold popular statewide elections as the means for determining
how they will exercise their constitutional prerogative to appoint
presidential electors.4 However, states are constitutionally free to
appoint their electors in many ways, including ways that do not include
elections. Pursuant to this freedom to choose how to appoint electors,
some state legislatures have recently decided that the honor of electing
the only official that represents the entire American people should
belong to the American people—not the states; these states (six states
and the District of Columbia with a combined seventy-four electoral
votes) have ratified the National Popular Vote Agreement (“NPV”).5
Once enough states have ratified the NPV, they will together appoint all
of their presidential electors according to which presidential candidate
wins the national popular vote for president, not who wins their
respective statewide popular votes.6
The NPV, by correlating the presidential election to the national
popular vote, would fundamentally change the political landscape of the
United States. Not surprisingly, the NPV has met opposition among
scholars and within the media.7 One specific critique is that this
agreement would violate the Compact Clause of the United States
Constitution.8 A ripe Compact Clause challenge to the NPV, brought
only after enough states have ratified the NPV, would pit the power the
Constitution affords states in one clause against the power afforded to
them in another clause. This is a fascinating story because these two
constitutional provisions—the Electoral College of Article II, section one,

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
See infra text accompanying note 29 (discussing same).
5
See infra Part II.B (discussing the NPV). The six states are Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Washington. See 57 D.C. Reg. 9869 (Dec. 24, 2010); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 14D-1 (2009); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/1–10 (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC.
LAW § 8-5A-01(West 2010); 2010 Mass. Acts Ch. 229; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:36-4 (West Supp.
2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.56.300 (West Supp. 2011). When Mayor Adrian Fenty
signed bill 18-0769 on October 12, 2010, the District of Columbia became the most recent (at
the time of this Note’s publication) to pass NPV legislation. See Washington DC, NAT’L
POPULAR VOTE (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/states.php?s
=DC.
6
See infra Part II.B (discussing the NPV).
7
See infra notes 86–89 and accompanying text (discussing policy and legal arguments
against the NPV).
8
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
3
4
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paragraph two and the Compact Clause—have never before been set in
opposition by adversaries with standing.
To add intrigue, consider that if congressional approval were
required per the Compact Clause before states could ratify the NPV,
states would essentially lose all political control; by taking away the
power of state legislators to appoint presidential electors in a manner of
their own choosing, state governments would no longer be accountable
to their citizens, but to the federal government. This would violate yet
another provision lurking in the Constitution, the Guarantee Clause,
which was ratified in order to prevent, among other perils,
encroachment by Congress into the sovereignty of the state
governments.9
This Note explores the guarantee of republican government
proffered by the Guarantee Clause in relation to the Compact Clause and
the plenary power that states exercise when determining how to appoint
presidential electors. Part II will explore the history of and explicate the
current understanding of the Electoral College, the NPV, the Compact
Clause, and the Guarantee Clause.10 Part III will analyze the interplay of
the NPV, Article II, and the Compact Clause in contemporary Supreme
Court jurisprudence.11 The Guarantee Clause has been dormant for
almost a century, a situation this Note will address in Part IV by
advocating for the awakening of this “sleeping giant” when and if the
NPV is challenged under the Compact Clause (or any other clause).12
II. BACKGROUND
This section explores the history and current perceptions of the
Electoral College, the NPV, and the Guarantee Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. The first Part will explain the mechanics of the Electoral
College.13 It will then draw attention to some of the methods exercised
through, as well as the scope of, state legislative power in choosing
presidential electors.14 Next, this Note examines what the NPV is and
does and the preeminent challenge to NPV legislation: the Compact

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
See infra Part II (discussing the background of the Electoral College, the NPV, the
Compact Clause, and the Guarantee Clause).
11
See infra Part III (discussing the same).
12
WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 290 (1972)
(quoting Charles Sumner); see also infra Part IV (discussing the same).
13
See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing how the Electoral College works).
14
See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing how state legislatures have chosen presidential
electors).
9

10
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Clause.15 This section concludes with a history of the Guarantee Clause,
which assures to the states a “Republican Form of Government.”16
A. “The Electoral College”
1.

Basic Mechanics of the Electoral College

Although the term electoral college cannot be found in the
Constitution, the electoral machinery alluded to by the phrase is treated
by Article II as a power expressly reserved for the states.17 The relevant
text reads:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of
Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the
Congress; but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office
of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.18

See infra Part II.B (discussing the same); infra Part II.C (discussing the same).
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see also infra Part II.D (discussing the same).
17
U.S.
Electoral
College
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
ARCHIVES.GOV,
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/faq.html#history (last visited
Dec. 23, 2010); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. “Elector,” which is found within the
Constitution, was a concept borrowed from the Holy Roman Empire to refer to those
princes who could participate in electing the German king—a person who usually became
Emperor. “College” means a group of people acting as a unit. U.S. Electoral College
Frequently Asked Questions, supra. “Electoral College” came into popular use in the early
1800s and today, “college of electors” can be found in 3 U.S.C. § 4. Id.
An express reservation of power within the National Constitution for state legislatures
is not rare; there are eleven such grants. JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE EQUAL: A
STATE-BASED PLAN FOR ELECTING THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE 292 (2d ed.,
2008). The other state legislative powers are the following: “choosing the manner of
electing U.S. Representatives and U.S. Senators; . . . choosing the manner of conducting a
popular election to fill a U.S. Senate vacancy; empowering the state’s governor to fill a U.S.
Senate vacancy temporarily . . . ; consenting to the purchase of enclaves by the federal
government . . . ; consenting to the formation of new states from territory of existing
state(s);” and “ratifying a proposed federal constitutional amendment; making an
application to Congress for a federal constitutional convention; [and] requesting federal
assistance to quell domestic violence.” Id.
18
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
15
16
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The Electoral College currently consists of 538 potential members.19 One
hundred members of the College correlate to the two Senators
representing each state in Congress, while 435 of its members mirror
each state’s proportional-to-population representation in the House of
Representatives.20 An additional three electors are allocated to the
District of Columbia.21
19
A Procedural Guide to the Electoral College, ARCHIVES.GOV, http://www.archives.gov/
federal-register/electoral-college/procedural_guide.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2009). This
site is maintained by the National Archivist who has several mandates pursuant to federal
law regarding the Electoral College. See 3 U.S.C. §§ 6, 11–13. The number 538 is
determined by: the U.S. Census pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 2a (governing the election of
Senators and Representatives); 3 U.S.C. § 3 (2006), which says, “[t]he number of electors
shall be equal to the number of Senators and Representatives to which the several States
are by law entitled;” and the Twenty-Third Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (granting
presidential electives, but not congressional representatives to Washington D.C.).
The term “potential” is appropriate as a state could fail to properly appoint its
electors, resulting in a decrease in the overall number of the College. See, e.g., McPherson v.
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 30 (1892) (recounting how the New York legislature did not appoint its
electors in the first presidential election because it could not agree on how to choose the
electors). That the number of electors in the College is only a potential number matters
because the Twelfth Amendment—and paragraph three of Article II which it superseded—
recognizes as President the candidate with a majority of the votes out of the whole number
of Electors appointed. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. This means that if all 538 potential electors
are appointed, then 270 electoral votes are required for a nominee to become President. Id.
If no candidate receives a majority of the electoral votes, then Congress is given the role of
selecting the President. Id. In this event, the House chooses the President through state
voting whereby each state delegation gets one vote, and the Senate chooses the Vice
President with each Senator getting a vote. Id.
20
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 cl. 2. Pursuant to the 2000 Census, California had fifty-five
electors in the 2008 Presidential election while seven states and the District of Columbia
each had three electors.
Distribution of 2008 Electoral Votes, ARCHIVES.GOV,
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/2008/allocation.html
(last
visited Dec. 23, 2010). Congressional representation—the system upon which the number
of electors is allocated—is a result of the Connecticut Compromise (“the Great
Compromise”) at the Constitutional Convention between the Virginia Plan (which favored
representation in Congress based upon population) and the New Jersey Plan (favored by
small states wanting equal state representation). PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 34–37, 262.
During the National Convention, Southern states were threatened by the prospect of
being in the minority in both houses; their fears were assuaged by the three-fifths
compromise which allowed their slave population to contribute to their representation in
the House without giving slaves the right to vote. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 72–74 (1996); see also
KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at xxvi (highlighting that ninety percent of the slave population
lived in the South). Madison said that slavery was the biggest obstacle to direct elections
for the President. PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 39. However, the debate about presidential
elections took place two months after the debate about congressional representation had
occurred, and the Great Compromise was added only as an afterthought. Id. at 261–62.
Small states did not see their true advantage in the Electoral College, which gave them
proportionally a bigger vote than large states, but instead in the House contingency plan
triggered when no candidate received a majority of the vote and where each state receives
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Presidential electors are officers of the state, not the federal
government.22 The presidential electors are chosen on the first Tuesday
after the first Monday in November, a day commonly perceived as a
presidential election day.23 On Election Day, citizens of the United States
do not directly cast votes for President of the United States; instead, they
are acting in their capacity as agents of their state legislatures—their
votes are the means by which state legislatures exercise their Article II
mandate to appoint presidential electors “in such [a] Manner” as they
may direct.24 The electors who have been appointed by virtue of each
state’s popular vote on Election Day do not actually vote for President
until “the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December next
following their appointment;” at that time, the presidential electors
gather in their respective states to carry out their charge and cast their
votes for President of the United States.25 After this act, the Electoral
College ceases to exist until the next presidential election.26 It is not until
January 6th of the following year at a joint session of Congress that the
votes cast by the now disbanded electors are actually counted.27 This
only one vote regardless of population. Id. at 262. Some Framers believed that most
presidential elections would end up utilizing the House contingency plan. See RAKOVE,
supra, at 90. James Madison wrote that the Electoral College was “the result of compromise
between the larger and smaller states, giving to the latter the advantage of selecting a
President from the candidates, in consideration of the former in selecting the candidates
from the people.” PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 37.
21
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII.
22
See Fitzgerald v. Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890) (holding that a state has jurisdiction
over an elector for election fraud because an elector is a state official); see also Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000) (“[P]residential electors are not officers or agents of the federal
government.”).
23
See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, Obama Elected President as Racial Barrier Falls, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2008, at A1 (announcing the victor of the election by publishing this article on the
first Tuesday after the first Monday in November 2008 when the votes had yet to be
officially counted by Congress in January).
24
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; see also, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 208.02 (West 2009)
(“Presidential electors shall be chosen at the state general election held in the year
preceding the expiration of the term of the president of the United States.”). Colorado is
the only state that constitutionally mandates that its residents be allowed to vote for
presidential electors. KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 57.
25
3 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
26
THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 20273, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE: HOW
IT WORKS IN CONTEMPORARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 5 (2003), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/28109.pdf.
27
Id. at 5–6. The congressional act of counting these votes has been the object of national
controversy in times past, most notably in the 1876 presidential election between Democrat
Samuel J. Tilden and Republican Rutherford B. Hayes. See generally PEIRCE, supra note 2, at
86–92. In that election cycle, four states sent different sets of elector returns and Congress
was tasked with deciphering which were legitimate and which were not. Id. at 88–89. A
temporary body—the Electoral Commission—convened to determine the presidential
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may seem confusing, which highlights the discrepancy between the
popular conception of a November presidential election and the legal
nicety holding that the next President is undetermined until January; this
discrepancy is to most people pedantic, an illustration of form over
substance.28
The discrepancy may seem pedantic because all states have for some
time designated popular elections by state voters, to the exclusion of
other constitutionally permissible means, as the process for appointing
electors.29 Forty-eight states use a winner-take-all, or general ticket
method for these popular elections.30 Under the winner-take-all system,
a vote for a presidential candidate is actually a vote cast for a slate, or a
ticket, consisting of a group of candidates for electors that has been
nominated prior to Election Day, usually by the state political parties.31
The slate that gets the most votes earns all of the state’s electors.32
Further, all states make use of a short ballot wherein only the names of
the presidential candidates and their running mates are revealed, not the
names of the presidential electors for whom the populace is technically
casting their ballots.33
To illustrate the winner-take-all and short ballot, consider the
following: A Minnesotan who went to the polls on November 2, 2004
(November 1 was the first Monday of November) to cast a vote for
George W. Bush and Dick Cheney filled in a bubble next to “George W.
Bush and Dick Cheney, Republican” because Minnesota uses a shortwinner. Id. at 89. In the aftermath, the Electoral Count Act of 1887 was passed in order to
prevent the same crisis from reoccurring; a provision from this Act, the safe-harbor
provision, was at the center of the dispute in the 2000 presidential election. See infra notes
50–56 and accompanying text (discussing the safe-harbor provision and the 2000
presidential election).
28
See ROBERT W. BENNETT, TAMING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 3 (2006). As Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted, “the vot[e by] the electors is a formality, predetermined by the popular
vote cast in each state on [election day].” Id. (quoting WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CENTENNIAL
CRISIS: THE DISPUTED ELECTION OF 1876, at 3 (2004)).
29
NEALE, supra note 26, at 3. State legislatures can constitutionally use any number of
methods to appoint electors. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the various methods used).
30
KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 53–54.
31
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 208.03–05 (West 2009) (laying out the process by which
the state’s major political parties nominate their respective presidential electors at state
conventions prior to election day). Thus, the presidential slate winner of California’s
general election would really be an appointment by the California legislature of fifty-five
electors who have pledged to vote for the Presidential slate winner. The nomination of the
electors prior to Election Day is often done during the state’s political party conventions.
KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 59. Twenty-nine states nominate electors in like fashion. Id.
In six states and the District of Columbia, state party committees nominate the electors,
while in Pennsylvania the Presidential nominee nominates the potential electors. Id.
32
KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 5.
33
Id. at 55–56. The short ballot is exemplified by the Minnesota ballot. Id.
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ballot that lists only the presidential candidates’ names, not the names of
the presidential electors.34 However, that Minnesotan actually cast a
ballot for George Cable, Jeff Carnes, Ronald Eibensteiner, Angie Erhard,
Eileen Fiore, Walter Klaus, Michelle Rifenberge, Julie Rosendahl, Lyall
Schwarzkopf, and Armin Tesch, all of whom together made up the
Republican “ticket” or “slate.”35 There are ten people named because
Minnesota has two U.S. Senators and eight Representatives in the House
for a total of ten possible presidential electors.36 Likewise, each of the
other presidential candidates on the Minnesota short ballot had ten
presidential electors for whom Minnesotans where actually voting.
Because Minnesota uses a winner-take-all system, and because only
1,346,695 people marked bubbles next to “George W. Bush and Dick
Cheney, Republican” as opposed to the 1,445,014 people who marked
bubbles next to “John F. Kerry and John Edwards, Democratic-FarmerLabor,” none of the Republican slate of presidential electors were
actually appointed by Minnesota.37 Instead, on December 13, 2004, ten
other people who constituted the Democratic-Farmer-Labor slate cast
their votes for John Kerry and John Edwards.38 These votes were not
actually seen or counted until January 6, 2005, when a joint session of
Congress officially counted them.39
A consequence of the nearly ubiquitous winner-take-all system is the
confusion and frustration created by the now-televised, unofficial, and
legally void national popular vote tally for President.40 As the 2000
presidential election between George W. Bush and Al Gore illustrated, it
is possible for a presidential candidate to win the popular vote and still
lose the presidency.41 Out of fifty-six U.S. presidential elections, only a
handful ended with divergent results between the popular vote and the

Id. at 57–58.
Id. at 58, 66.
36
See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing how states are apportioned their
number of electors).
37
KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 64–67.
38
See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text (explaining the general ticket and short
ballot).
39
Supra text accompanying note 27.
40
See, e.g., David Stout, The 2000 Campaign: The Electoral College; How Winner of the
Popular Vote Could Lose After All, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/
2000/11/03/us/2000-campaign-electoral-college-winner-popular-vote-could-lose-afterall.html (citing Representative Ray LaHood as saying, “[i]t would be a travesty if the
winner of the popular vote on Nov. 7 did not become president because of the Electoral
College”).
41
See, e.g., Ronald Brownstein, Polls Show Victory Could Come Without Winning Popular
Vote, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2000, at A1 (quoting law professor Erwin Chemerinsky).
34
35
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Electoral College count.42 More often, there have been “hairbreadth”
elections in which a strategic shift in less than one percent of the popular
vote would have changed the outcome in the Electoral College without
changing the winner of the popular vote.43 Yet, despite its infrequency,
this kind of result has galvanized some who seek to abolish the Electoral
College; nearly ten percent of all congressionally proposed amendments
to the U.S. Constitution have concerned Electoral College reform.44
Others, recognizing the political challenge of abolishing the Electoral
College, point with urgency to the benefit of reforming specific aspects of
TARA ROSS, ENLIGHTENED DEMOCRACY: THE CASE FOR THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 168–
69 (2005). Depending on who is counting, there are only two to four elections with
different results. The four presidents who could be characterized as winning the Electoral
College while losing the popular vote are John Quincy Adams (1824), Rutherford B. Hayes
(1876), Benjamin Harrison (1888), and George W. Bush (2000). Id. at 168. Tara Ross argues
that only the 1888 and 2000 elections can accurately be characterized as elections wherein
the clear winner of the popular vote lost the presidency. Id. at 170. She points out that in
1824, presidential electors were not chosen by popular elections in many states, but by state
legislators, and so there is no accurate count of the real national popular vote from that
election. Id. at 168. The 1876 election could be dismissed for similar reasons—in this case
because elections in the South were not “fair and free.” Id. at 168–69. Others see the 1876
election as a clear example of discrepancy between the popular vote and the Electoral
College vote. See, e.g., BENNETT, supra note 28, at 209 n.96 (citing to Chief Justice
Rehnquist). Robert Bennett also denotes the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon election as a debatable
example—debatable because it is uncertain who won the popular vote in that election due
to a combination of how Alabama ballots were configured and a complex political situation
in Alabama at the time. Id.
43
PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 317–21. In the 1828 election, a shift of 11,517 votes in five states
would have changed the outcome. Id. at 318. In 1836, a shift in 14,061 votes in New York
would have changed the outcome. Id. In 1840, a change in 8386 votes in four states would
have changed the outcome. Id. In 1844, a change of 2555 votes in New York would have
changed the outcome. Id. In 1848, a shift of 3227 votes in three states would have changed
the outcome. Id. In 1856, a shift in 17,427 votes (out of 4,030,137 total votes cast) would
have changed the outcome. Id. In 1860, a shift of 18,050 votes (out of 3,838,290 total votes
cast) in four states would have changed the outcome. Id. at 319. In 1864, a shift of 38,111
votes (out of a total of 4,024,425 total votes cast) in seven states would have changed the
outcome. Id. In 1868, a change of 29,862 votes in seven states would have altered the
outcome. Id. In 1880, a shift of 10,517 votes in New York would have altered the outcome.
Id. In 1884, a shift in 575 votes in New York would have changed the outcome. Id. at 320.
In 1892, a change in 37,364 votes in five states would have changed the outcome. Id. In
1896, 20,296 votes in six states would have changed the outcome. Id. In 1900, a shift in
74,755 votes (out of 13,577,988 total votes cast) in seven states would have changed the
outcome. Id. In 1908, a shift in 75,041 votes in eight states would have changed the
outcome. Id. In 1916, a shift of 1983 votes in California would have changed the outcome.
Id. at 321. In 1948, a shift in 29,294 votes (out of 46,170,636 total votes cast) in three states
would have changed the outcome. Id.
44
Note, Rethinking the Electoral College Debate: The Framers, Federalism, and One Person,
One Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2526, 2526 (2001); see also KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 275
(citing Gallup News Service which indicated between 65% and 81% public support for
nationwide popular election of the president during the years 1944 to 1980).
42
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the Electoral College.45 Calls for reform or constitutional amendments
are answered by supporters of the Electoral College who maintain that it
prevents the tyranny of direct democracies, magnifies both minority
concerns and presidential mandates, encourages national coalition
building, decreases the possibility of fraud, fortifies the two-party
45
See generally, e.g., BENNETT, supra note 28, at ch. 5–8 (describing the need for reform of
the contingent procedure for selection of the president by the House of Representatives and
for the problem of “faithless electors”). The contingent procedure occurs when a
presidential candidate receives a plurality of the electoral vote, i.e. when no presidential
candidate receives a majority of the votes. Id. at 74; see also supra note 19 (explaining the
Framers’ intent regarding the House contingency plan). This process, originally governed
by Article II of the U.S. Constitution, is now governed by the Twelfth Amendment. See
BENNETT, supra note 28, at 23. Prior to the Twelfth Amendment, electors did not vote for
vice president; instead, the person receiving the second highest number of votes would
become vice president. Id. The Twelfth Amendment was drafted and ratified after the
1800 presidential election when Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr—both members of the
same party who had run as a ticket together—received the same number of votes, all votes
being cast only for president. Id. at 22–23. Congress had to decide which of the two would
be president and which would be vice president despite Jefferson having been the
presidential candidate and Burr the vice presidential candidate. Id. In shrewd political
maneuvering, the party of John Adams, Jefferson’s original opponent, supported Aaron
Burr against Jefferson so that there was a deadlock. Id. at 22. Jefferson eventually won, but
the debacle prompted passage of the Twelfth Amendment, which separates presidential
and vice-presidential candidates. Id. at 23. It also, for purposes of the contingency plan
when there is not a majority winner, gives the House the top three vote getters in the
election and not the top five as Article II had dictated. Id.
Today, the thought that the House could determine the president of the United States
is considered by some otherwise proponents of the Electoral College as horrible for
democracy. See ROSS, supra note 42, at 127 (elucidating that the House contingency plan
could “degenerate into self-interested deal-making among representatives[, making the
President feel] indebted” and damaging our system of government, “which values
separation of powers among the branches”). The “faithless elector” problem is the result of
presidential electors being able to cast votes in opposition to voters’ expectations. Id. at
113. Alexander Hamilton argued for the Electoral College by pointing to electors as “men
most capable of analizing [sic] the qualities adapted to the station [of President].” THE
FEDERALIST No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton says that the electors will have the
requisite information for investigation, will deliberate, and be able to discern who could be
the best President. Id. Hamilton further says the electors—being so close to the people—
will have a “sense” for their desires, but this did not mean electors would necessarily vote
for the candidates wanted by a provincial people possibly swayed by the “little arts of
popularity.” Id. at 344, 346.
Historically, only a dozen or so electors have cast votes contrary to their instructions.
BENNETT, supra note 28, at 96. Today, while electors may pledge to vote for specific
candidates, they retain the power to vote for whomever they desire, or even abstain from
voting altogether. ROSS, supra note 42, at 113–14. For example, three “faithless” votes could
have given Al Gore the election in 2000 and a change in two electoral votes would have
deprived Bush of a majority, requiring the House contingency plan to take effect. Id. at 113.
Tara Ross, who is a strong advocate of maintaining the Electoral College largely as-is, says,
“[i]f any change is to be made to the presidential election system, it should be to eliminate
the role of elector and automate the process of casting the states’ electoral votes.” Id. at 114.
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system, and preserves a necessary component of the separation of
powers—federalism.46
Despite the prevalence of the winner-take-all system, two states,
Maine and Nebraska, apportion their electors according to which
presidential team wins each congressional district, while the two
remaining electors correlating to the two Senate seats are designated
according to the state’s popular vote.47 These states “are reminders of
the flexibility that the Founders built into the U.S. Constitution.”48 It is to
this flexibility that this Note now turns.49
46
E.g., ROSS, supra note 42, at 34, 39, 41, 58, 110, 170. Tyranny of the majority is
understood as, in a direct democracy, the capability of fifty-one percent of the people to
rule over the other forty-nine percent because representatives are merely purveyors of the
public will. Id. at 34. The magnification of minority interests is exemplified by the Jewish
vote in New York carrying more influence than it would in a national vote, or as in Strom
Thurmond’s presidential bid in 1948, which garnered an insignificant 2.4% popular vote
but thirty-nine electoral votes (7.3%). Id. at 41, 212. Magnifying a presidential mandate to
govern is illustrated by John F. Kennedy’s tiny popular vote win in 1960—.2%—which was
magnified into an eighty-two vote win in the Electoral College; only two elections since
1804 were won by fewer than a twenty electoral vote margin. Id. at 103–04.
By encouraging national coalition building, a proponent of the Electoral College
means that presidential campaigns must be national in character and cannot focus on, for
example, only rural areas or only urban areas, nor can small states be excluded. Id. at 87–
88; see also George F. Will, From Schwarzenegger, a Veto for Voters’ Good, WASH. POST, Oct. 12,
2006, at A27 (arguing that the coalition building required by the Electoral College requires
a “politics of accommodation” that prevents narrowly defined majorities). But see KOZA ET
AL., supra note 17, at 10, 11 (listing seventeen states in the 2004 presidential election that
received ninety-nine percent of advertising expenditures—five states of these receiving
seventy-two percent of the funds—and sixteen states which received ninety-two percent of
all presidential and vice-presidential visits during the campaign).
The Electoral College is also said to minimize fraud by isolating allegations of fraud to
states where a recount is necessary only if the vote is close; in a direct popular vote system,
suspected fraud could trigger national recounts at great cost. ROSS, supra note 42, at 110.
State rights are also intricately woven into the Electoral College, the Great Compromise—
which gave to small states equal representation in the Senate and to big states more
representation in the House—being the basis for how many electoral votes each state gets
to cast. Id. at 50. The Electoral College also helps to prevent fractious third-party
candidates from dividing the nation. See Will, supra (using Ross Perot’s 1992 presidential
bid, wherein he received 18.9% of the popular vote but no electoral votes, to show how the
Electoral College prevented the fragmentation inherent in a direct popular vote). The
federal electoral system also helps protect the country itself by muting extremist interests
and dangerous factions who, for want of a national platform, are unable to appeal to the
people at large and are instead forced to moderate themselves as they attempt to build
coalitions with other groups in other states. ROSS, supra note 42, at 58.
47
KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 7.
48
Id.
49
There are many more technical and mechanical aspects involved in the Electoral
College which are beyond the scope of this Note. See generally 3 U.S.C. ch. 1 (2006 & Supp.
II 2008) (codifying the many procedures involved in counting electoral votes, certification
of electors, the steps to take in the event of vacancies, etc.). See also Stephen Siegel, The
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The Scope and Methods by Which States Have Historically
Appointed Electors

The United States Supreme Court’s per curiam opinion in Bush v.
Gore is rich in recognition of a state’s plenary power in choosing
presidential electors pursuant to Article II of the United States
Constitution.50 Set against the backdrop of the 2000 presidential election
between Al Gore and George W. Bush, the central dispute in Bush was
the applicability of the “safe harbor” provision found in 3 U.S.C. § 5,
which holds that “[i]f any State shall have provided . . . for its final
determination of . . . the appointment of all or any of the electors . . . at
least six days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors, such
determination . . . shall be conclusive.”51 This provision means that
Congress cannot challenge how a state chooses its electors so long as
they are chosen by the allotted time.52 After Florida’s popular election to
choose its presidential electors, Gore alleged that legal votes had not
been counted and asked for a recount.53 Determining that a recount that
satisfied equal protection parameters could not be completed in time to
meet the safe-harbor deadline, the Court had to decide which branch of
Florida’s government ultimately controlled the appointment of
presidential electors: the judicial branch or the legislative branch.54 If
Conscientious Congressman’s Guide to the Electoral Count Act of 1887, 56 FLA. L. REV. 541 (2004)
(expounding upon the Electoral Count Act of 1887).
50
See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (maintaining throughout the case the
assumption that the Court’s role was to determine which part of Florida’s government had
supreme authority over appointing presidential electors).
51
3 U.S.C. § 5 (2006); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 960–63 (2d ed. 2005).
52
3 U.S.C. § 5.
53
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 51, at 962. In the Florida trial court, Al Gore challenged the
certification of vote counts in several Florida counties, arguing that according to Florida
statute, legal votes had not been counted. Id. The Florida trial court denied Gore relief. Id.
On appeal, the matter was certified to the Florida Supreme Court, which found that there
were indeed legal, uncounted votes. Id. The Florida Supreme Court ordered a manual
recount. Id. at 963.
54
Bush, 531 U.S. at 111–13 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Pursuant to 3 U.S.C. § 5, the
Florida statute required vote counts be given by canvassing boards to the Florida secretary
of state by a specified date so as to take advantage of the federal safe-harbor provision, a
date which could not have been met if the manual recount had taken place. Id. at 111.
Thus, there were two Florida statutes in conflict with one another—the statute under which
Gore had asked for a recount and the statute under which the secretary of state mandated a
return of the votes by a specified date in order to take advantage of the safe-harbor
provision. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 51, at 961. The Florida Supreme Court believed it was
exercising its constitutionally mandated power of statutory interpretation by harmonizing
the two conflicting statutes. Id. It decided to give those manually recounting the votes
enough time to do so, therefore permitting a recount that would have extended beyond the
date allowing Florida to take advantage of the safe-harbor provision. Id. The U.S. Supreme
Court’s per curiam opinion found that the Florida statute favoring 3 U.S.C. § 5—the safe-
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the legislative branch had ultimate control, then its intent to honor the
safe-harbor provision meant that if a recount could not be done before
December 12, then there could be no recount.55 If the judicial branch had
ultimate control, then its decision to proceed with a recount that could
not be finished by December 12 would stand.56 In reaching its
conclusion that the Florida legislature was not bound by the Florida
Constitution when exercising its Article II powers to appoint presidential
electors, the per curiam opinion cited McPherson v. Blacker to declare that
the “the state legislature’s power to select the manner for appointing
electors is plenary.”57
McPherson itself offers concrete historical examples of the flexibility
of state power in appointing electors.58 The appointment of electors in
the first presidential election was made by the legislatures of
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, New Jersey, and South Carolina.59
Pennsylvania had a general ticket election.60 Maryland also had a
general election but with the stipulation that five of the electors be from
the Western Shore and three from the Eastern Shore.61 New York failed
to appoint any electors because of a disagreement between the New York
harbor provision—controlled as an application of the state legislature’s U.S. Constitution
Article II power, which permitted Florida to appoint electors in whatever manner its
legislature determined. Id. at 111–12. Thus, the Florida Supreme Court overreached by
infringing the Florida legislature’s prerogative to take advantage of 3 U.S.C. § 5. Id. For
more on the safe-harbor provision, see supra note 27.
55
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 51, at 961.
56
Id.
57
Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 (citing McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892)).
58
McPherson, 146 U.S. at 29. McPherson involved a political drama that took place in
Michigan, a microcosm of the incessant political wrangling between Republicans and
Democrats that still occurs on the national level. See KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 53–54. In
the 1888 presidential election, President Grover Cleveland won the national popular vote
but lost his presidential bid within the Electoral College framework. Id. at 53. At that time,
most states had winner-take-all elections, including Michigan, prior to 1890. Id. While
Michigan was primarily a Republican-dominated state at the time, the Democrats won
control of the Michigan legislature in the 1890 midterm elections. Id. Expecting that
Michigan’s electoral votes would again go to the Republican nominee in the 1892
presidential election, the newly elected Democrats changed Michigan from winner-take-all
to state congressional district voting with each of the two senatorial electors chosen from a
combined half of the congressional districts. Id. In this fashion, in the 1892 presidential
election, Michigan would be able to contribute some electoral votes to the Democratic
presidential nominee. Id. The Supreme Court ruled that the Michigan legislature had the
power to act as it did in restricting presidential elector appointments. Id. at 53. The
outcome of the Michigan legislature’s act and subsequent affirmation by the Supreme
Court resulted in five of fourteen Michigan electoral votes going for Democratic
presidential nominee Grover Cleveland. Id. at 53–54.
59
McPherson, 146 U.S. at 29.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 29–30.
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assembly and the New York Senate over how many electors each
chamber would get to choose.62 Virginia had elections for the electors by
districts other than the districts used for electing Representatives to the
House.63 Massachusetts had a two-tiered system wherein voters voted in
their congressional districts for electors and the top two candidates in
each district were then voted upon, district by district, by the
Massachusetts legislature with two additional at-large electors also being
voted for by the legislature.64 In the fourth presidential election, in
Tennessee, by an Act of its legislature in 1799, delegates were selected by
the legislature who then voted for the electors.65
In McPherson, after continuing its exposé of electoral appointment
through subsequent elections, the Court, quoting Justice Story,
articulated that power is different than policy and that while many
“ingenious minds” may take offense at the arbitrary nature of the
Electoral College, until there is a constitutional amendment, the power
remains vested in the state legislature.66 Citing to McPherson, the per
curiam opinion in Bush reaffirmed the Court’s recognition of this state
power when it said, “[t]he State, of course, after granting the franchise in
the special context of Article II, can take back the power to appoint
electors.”67

Id. at 30.
Id. at 29.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 32.
66
Id. at 33, 35–36. The Court continued:
Mr. Justice Story, in considering the subject in his Commentaries on
the Constitution, and writing nearly fifty years after the adoption of
that instrument, after stating that “in some states the legislatures have
directly chosen the electors by themselves; in others, they have been
chosen by the people by a general ticket throughout the whole State;
and in others, by the people by electoral districts, fixed by the
legislature, a certain number of electors being apportioned to each
district,” adds: “No question has ever arisen as to the constitutionality
of either mode, except that by a direct choice by the legislature. But
this, though often doubted by able and ingenious minds, has been
firmly established in practice ever since the adoption of the
Constitution, and does not now seem to admit of controversy, even if a
suitable tribunal existed to adjudicate upon it.” And he remarks that
“it has been thought desirable by many statesmen to have the
Constitution amended so as to provide for a uniform mode of choice
by the people.”
Id. at 33 (internal citations omitted).
67
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000). The Court quotes a single line from McPherson
that reads, “[T]here is no doubt of the right of the legislature to resume the power at any
time, for it can neither be taken away nor abdicated.” Id. (quoting McPherson, 146 U.S. at
35). The full text from which this section was taken reads as follows:
62
63
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There is one caveat to the states’ plenary power in appointing
electors: when a state via its legislature charges its people to appoint
electors through a popular election, equal weight must be afforded to
each vote and equal dignity is owed to each voter.68 In other words,
when utilizing popular elections, states are confined to constitutionally
mandated equal protection parameters regarding voter qualifications.69
The Fourteenth Amendment expressly recognizes the popular vote as a
means for appointing presidential electors by warning that state
representative apportionment in Congress will be “reduced in the
proportion” to the eligible male voters denied the vote for presidential
electors.70 Subsequent amendments took away most state discretion for
determining who can vote in popular elections by mandating that the
franchise be extended to blacks, women, and all U.S. citizens eighteen
years of age or older; further, no citizen can be denied the right to vote
for a presidential elector for failure to pay any tax.71

The appointment of these electors is thus placed absolutely and wholly
with the legislatures of the several States. They may be chosen by the
legislature, or the legislature may provide that they shall be elected by
the people of the State at large, or in districts, as are members of
Congress, which was the case formerly in many States; and it is, no
doubt, competent for the legislature to authorize the governor, or the
Supreme Court of the State, or any other agent of its will, to appoint these
electors. This power is conferred upon the legislatures of the States by
the Constitution of the United States, and cannot be taken from them
or modified by their State constitutions any more than can their power
to elect Senators of the United States. Whatever provisions may be
made by statute, or by the state constitution, to choose electors by the
people, there is no doubt of the right of the legislature to resume the
power at any time, for it can neither be taken away nor abdicated.
McPherson, 146 U.S. at 34–35 (emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. NO. 43-395 (1874)).
68
E.g., Bush, 531 U.S. at 104–05 (articulating the same).
69
See, e.g., id. (articulating the obligation of states to ensure equal protection for popular
elections).
70
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. Thus, the black male population would not be included
in a state’s total population for means of allotting House seats to that state if black males
over twenty-one years of age were not entitled to vote. Id. The relevance of this section of
the Fourteenth Amendment has been nullified by the Fifteenth Amendment, which
mandates that voters may not be denied the franchise because of race or color. U.S. CONST.
amend. XV.
71
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (1971); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (1964); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIX (1920); U.S. CONST. amend. XV (1870); see also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368,
380–81 (1963) (holding that statewide elections cannot use a system which weighs some
votes more than others).
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Recognizing that states have plenary power limited only by
constitutional grants of equal protection in determining which agents
shall appoint its electors, several states, taking advantage of the
flexibility offered by Article II of the Constitution, have ratified the NPV
legislation that is, as of now, yet to be executed.72 This Note now turns to
this legislation.
B. National Popular Vote Legislation
Currently, six states and the District of Columbia have ratified the
National Popular Vote Bill.73 The impetus of these statutes was the 2000
Presidential Election in which George W. Bush lost to Al Gore in the
national popular vote but won the Electoral College Vote and thus the
Presidency.74 In February 2006, the organization National Popular Vote
held its initial press conference.75
Infra note 73 and accompanying text.
NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE, http://www.nationalpopularvote.com (last visited Dec.
23, 2010) [hereinafter NPV MAIN]. The six states are Illinois, Hawaii, Maryland, New
Jersey, Massachusetts, and Washington (with a total of seventy-four electoral votes when
combined with those of the District of Columbia). Id. Most recently, the District of
Columbia enacted the National Popular Vote Bill on October 12, 2010. NATIONAL POPULAR
VOTE, http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/states.php?s=DC (Oct. 12, 2010)
[hereinafter NPV D.C.]. Beyond these six states, the legislation has passed both chambers
in four other states, one house in ten other states, and has been introduced in eleven other
states. Id. The text of the agreement provides that any state of the United States and the
District of Columbia may become a member of the agreement by its enactment and that
each member state shall conduct a statewide popular election for President and Vice
President of the United States. E.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/5 art. II–III (2010). The
agreement requires each member state’s chief election official to immediately convey its
own state popular vote total and then to add together the popular vote of every other state
conducting a statewide popular vote (regardless if the state conducting the vote has ratified
the agreement) and the District of Columbia in order to determine the national popular
vote count. Id. at art. III. The agreement provides that in the nearly impossible case of a tie,
each state’s electors shall pledge their votes to that state’s popular vote winner. Id. The
agreement is to take effect in any year in which the agreement has been ratified by states
cumulatively possessing a majority of the electoral votes—270—and no later than July 20 of
that year. Id. When it takes effect, each state’s electors shall cast their votes in accordance
with the aggregated popular vote tally of all the states combined and the winner will be
designated the national popular vote winner. Id. The agreement allows member states to
withdraw from the agreement, but requires this to be done before the final six months of
the current president’s term of office. Id. at art. IV. The agreement also provides that it will
terminate if the Electoral College is abolished. Id.
74
Robert Bennett produced vague outlines of the idea in the spring of 2001. Robert
Bennett, Popular Election of the President Without a Constitutional Amendment, 4 GREEN BAG
2d 241, 241 (2001). The plan was further developed by Bennett in subsequent publications
and then by Akhil Reed Amar and Vikram David Amar, who are also considered the idea’s
founders. KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 270–71. The 2000 election represents only the
newest incarnation of dissatisfaction of some with how the Electoral College seems to
work. E.g., McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 33 (1892) (“[I]t has been thought desirable by
72
73
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The NPV works in the following way. Utilizing the plenary power
of state presidential elector appointment, ratifying states predetermine
that their presidential electoral ballots be cast in accordance with the
winner of the national popular vote when enough states have ratified the
legislation so that their total combined electoral votes number 270—the
amount required to avoid the House contingency plan if all 538 members
cast electoral ballots.76 The House contingency plan originates from the
Twelfth Amendment, which gives Congress the power to vote for
President if no candidate receives a majority of the electoral votes cast.77
Until such a time when enough states have passed the NPV, it will
remain inoperative.78 While the NPV cannot compel non-ratifying states
to hold statewide popular elections, it does require each ratifying state to
hold a statewide popular election.79 This mandate helps to establish a
necessary precondition for the agreement—that there will be popular
votes to count.80
Following election-Tuesday, the chief election officer of every state,
usually the secretary of state, is to obtain statements from all states,
regardless of if they have adopted the NPV, designating the number of
popular votes cast for each candidate.81 The NPV requires use of the
short ballot so that votes from all ratifying states can be easily added
together.82 The authors of the legislation recognize that if a non-member
state decided to take the presidential vote away from its people, or if a
non-member state removed the names of the presidential candidates,
there would be no votes to count from that state.83 In this event, the
national popular vote would be determined by all member states and
many statesmen to have the Constitution amended so as to provide for a uniform mode of
choice by the people.” (quoting Justice Story)).
75
Matthew Pincus, When Should Interstate Compacts Require Congressional Consent?, 42
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 511, 511 (2009).
76
E.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/5 art. II–III.
77
U.S. CONST. amend. XII. The House votes, each state having only one vote, for
president from the three candidates who receive the most electoral votes. Id. The Senate
votes for the vice president, each Senator having one vote. Id. It is possible under this
contingency plan for the Congress to elect a President and Vice President from two
different political parties. Id. For more on the House contingency plan, see supra notes 19
and 45.
78
E.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/5 art. II–III.
79
See, e.g., id. (“Each member state shall conduct a statewide popular election for
President and Vice President of the United States.”).
80
KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 250.
81
Id. at 253.
82
Id. at 252. The short ballot is used in order to permit “the aggregation, from state to
state, of the popular votes that have been cast for various presidential slates.” Id. For an
explanation of the short ballot, see supra text accompanying note 33.
83
KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 253–54.
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non-member states holding popular elections with presidential names on
the ballots.84 The winner of the largest number of popular votes across
the nation shall be designated the “national popular vote winner.”85
The NPV has sparked criticism laced with policy reasons critical of
the legislation; most of these arguments being the same as those used in
support of the Electoral College.86 The NPV has been called simple
minded and “[a]n [e]nd [r]un [a]round the Constitution” because it is
perceived as changing the Electoral College without amending the
Constitution.87 NPV promoters offer their own slew of policy rationale
in support of the plan, from the Electoral College’s shameful birth in the
slave-driven Connecticut Compromise to the disparity in the weight
accorded individual votes from different states.88 Policy reasons aside,
several legal arguments against the NPV have concentrated on the
Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution.89
C. The “Compact Clause” Challenge to the National Popular Vote
Several recent law review articles conclude that the NPV would,
upon its execution when enough states ratify it, be a violation of the
Compact Clause.90 The Compact Clause is contained in Article I, section
Id. at 254.
E.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT 20/5. art. III (2010).
86
E.g., About Us, SAVE OUR STATES, http://www.saveourstates.com/about/ (last visited
Dec. 23, 2010) (arguing against the NPV by citing the strengths of the Electoral College).
Likewise, those arguing for the NPV cite reasons why the Electoral College is harmful or
outdated. E.g., Birch Bayh, Forward in KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at xxv (stating that the
Electoral College has outlived any positive role it once played and that the NPV is a good
strategy for overcoming the shortcomings of the Electoral College).
87
See David S. Broder, An End Run Around the Constitution, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2006, at
B07 (arguing that the NPV is an end run around the Constitution because it seeks to change
the Electoral College without utilizing the necessary amendment process); Julia Silverman,
Oregon, Other States Consider End Run Around Electoral College, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 28, 2007,
8:01 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2003545454_webelectoral28.
html; Will, supra note 46 (praising California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger after he
vetoed the NPV legislation which, had it become law, “would have imparted dangerous
momentum to a recurring simple-mindedness”). David Broder argues that NPV advocates
ignore the NPV’s impact on “two of the fundamental characteristics of the American
scheme of government: the federal system and the two-party system.” Broder, supra.
88
KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at xxiii, xxvi, 21, 22.
89
See infra note 90 (discussing the same).
90
E.g., Charles S. Doskow & David A. Sonner, Vox Populi: Is It Time to Reform the
Electoral College?, 55 FED. LAW. 33 (2008); Derek T. Muller, The Compact Clause and the
National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, 6 ELECTION L.J. 372 (2007). But see Pincus, supra
note 75, at 511 (arguing that although the NPV would not violate the Compact Clause, the
Court should revisit the Compact Clause so that the NPV does violate the clause); Adam
Schleifer, Interstate Agreement for Electoral Reform, 40 AKRON L. REV. 717, 749 (2007) (posing
the possibility that the NPV is viable under current Compact Clause jurisprudence, but that
84
85
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10, clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution and in relevant part reads: “No State
shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State . . . .”91 Because the NPV is an agreement
which, as written and ratified, requires several states to have ratified the
plan before it takes effect, it has been posited that such an agreement
would require the consent of Congress, without which the agreement
would be rendered unconstitutional.92 The overarching concern of this
Note is addressing how this challenge to the NPV implicates each state’s
republican form of government.93
it may be the straw that breaks the camel’s back).
For a general argument against the current viability of the Court’s interpretation of the
Compact Clause, see Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent, 68 MO.
L. REV. 285 (2003). Several law review articles have specifically addressed state
coordination for popularly electing the president and have concluded that this would not
violate the Compact Clause. E.g., Bennett, supra note 74, at 170–71; Jennifer S. Hendricks,
Popular Election of the President: Using or Abusing the Electoral College?, 7 ELECTION L.J. 218
(2008); Jennings “Jay” Wilson, Note, Bloc Voting in the Electoral College: How the Ignored
States Can Become Relevant and Implement Popular Election Along the Way, 5 ELECTION L.J. 384,
402–03 (2006) (explicating that the agreement is not an agreement under the Court’s
understanding; that if it is an agreement, such an agreement still does not fall within the
purview of the Court; and finally, that because there is no case law addressing this issue,
there is no way of knowing if the Court would entertain a challenge to the NPV under the
Compact Clause). Other proponents of a national popular vote utilizing the Electoral
College have also dismissed the Compact Clause as inapplicable. E.g., KOZA ET AL., supra
note 17, at 187–241; Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, How to Achieve Direct
National Election of the President Without Amending the Constitution: Part Three of a Three-Part
Series
on
the
2000
Election
and
the
Electoral
College,
FINDLAW.COM,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20011228.html (Dec. 28, 2001). Akhil Reed Amar and
Vikram David Amar ponder:
Should expressly coordinated state laws of the sort we are imagining
be deemed an implicit interstate agreement requiring congressional
blessing under Article I, section 10 of the Constitution? Probably not.
After all, each state would retain complete unilateral freedom to switch
back to its older system for any future election, and the coordinated
law creates no new interstate governmental apparatus. Indeed, the
cooperating states acting together would be exercising no more power
than they are entitled to wield individually. (The matter might be
different if the coordinating states had sought to freeze other states
out—say, by agreeing to back the candidate winning the most total
votes within the coordinating states as a collective bloc, as opposed to
the most total votes nationwide.)
Id.
91
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
92
Muller, supra note 90, at 373. Muller also considers the NPV unconstitutional under
the Compact Clause because states are restrained from withdrawing from it for a specific
period and because non-member states are too negatively affected. Id. But see Hendricks,
supra note 90, at 225–26 (responding specifically to Muller’s article and concluding that the
NPV does not violate the Compact Clause).
93
See infra Part IV (concluding that requiring congressional consent for the NPV would
violate the Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 [2011], Art. 9

812

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

The first case to reach the Supreme Court that specifically addressed
this clause was Virginia v. Tennessee.94 Compact Clause analysis is
currently guided by U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission.95 Both
Virginia and U.S. Steel Corp. offer the same conclusion: the clause is
meant to prevent the “formation of any combination tending
to . . . encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United
States.”96 U.S. Steel affirmed Virginia’s holding, which the Court must
consider if the compact in question “enhances state power quoad the
National Government.”97 Further, the Court in U.S. Steel looked to actual
infringement on federal sovereignty as opposed to Virginia’s emphasis
on potential infringement.98

94
148 U.S 503 (1893). This case involved a boundary dispute between the two named
parties. Id. at 504. The states settled the dispute by a compact or agreement after a jointcommissioned study determined what was thought to be the proper boundary. Id. at 514–
17. Congress never expressly consented to the compact that recognized the boundary. Id.
at 517. Later, Virginia decided that the boundary established by the agreement was not
correct and sought to invalidate the agreement under the Compact Clause because there
had been no express consent by Congress. Id. The Court held that Congress had implied
its consent and that the Compact Clause applies to alliances between states that might
infringe on the power of the federal government. Id. at 525.
95
See 434 U.S 452, 478–79 (1978) (holding that not all agreements between states are
subject to strictures of the Compact Clause but that instead only those agreements that are
directed to the formation of any combination tending to increase the political power in the
states and which may encroach on or interfere with the just supremacy of the United
States).
The Multistate Tax Compact was drafted in 1966 and had twenty-one state members
in 1978 at the time this case was heard. Id. at 454. It was created to streamline tax liability
and payments for people owing taxes in multiple states. Id. at 452. U.S. Steel brought a
suit after being threatened with an audit by the Multistate Tax Commission. Id. U.S. Steel
wanted the compact to be invalidated under the Compact Clause because it had not
received the consent of Congress. Id.
96
U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 471; Virginia, 148 U.S. at 519. Further:
Quoting with approval Justice Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States, the Court held that while “the consent of Congress
may be properly required, in order to check any infringement of the
rights of the national government,” nonetheless, “a total prohibition to
enter into any compact or agreement might be attended with
permanent inconvenience or public mischief.” For this reason, the
Court concluded, the Compact Clause cannot have been intended to
apply to all interstate agreements. Rather, “looking at the object of the
constitutional provision,” the Court determined that the Compact
Clause’s “prohibition is directed to the formation of any combination
tending to . . . encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of
the United States.
Pincus, supra note 75, at 523 (footnotes omitted).
97
U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 473.
98
Greve, supra note 90, at 306–07.
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How or whether an interstate compact potentially or actually
infringes on federal power is a vertical analysis; the Court has
abandoned any horizontal analysis of whether an interstate compact
infringes on the rights of non-member states.99 While most interstate
compacts operate with congressional approval, there are no instances of
interstate compacts between states being invalidated by the Court due to
a lack of congressional approval.100 The Multistate Tax Agreement and
the more recent Master Settlement Agreement, which ended litigation
against giant tobacco companies, are two instances of compacts
established without congressional consent but upheld by federal courts
in the face of Compact Clause challenges.101
The Council of State Governments has classified twenty-one types of
interstate compacts, but no interstate compact has ever addressed
elections.102 As the current Compact Clause regime stands under U.S.
Steel, non-member states may suffer secondary effects of an interstate
compact without the compact violating the Compact Clause, so long as
the sovereignty of the non-member states is not threatened.103 This Note
now turns to the nature of state sovereignty under the Constitution’s
Guarantee Clause.
D. “The Guarantee Clause”
The exact denotation of “republican form of government” is
impossible to pin down.104 Its seminal origins as a textual reference
within American law lie in Thomas Jefferson’s 1776 rough drafts of

Id.
Id. at 285, 288–89. Examples of subject matter covered by interstate compacts include:
agriculture, boundaries, crime control and corrections, education, energy, facilities,
fisheries, flood-control, marketing and development, motor-vehicles, etc. KOZA ET AL.,
supra note 17, at 192–200; see also What Is the National Center for Interstate Compacts?,
COUNCIL OF ST. GOVERNMENTS, http://www.csg.org/programs/policyprograms/NCIC/
default.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2009) (“The National Center for Interstate Compacts
(NCIC) is designed to be an information clearinghouse, . . . a primary facilitator in assisting
states review, revise and create new interstate compacts to solve multi-state problems or
provide alternatives to federal pre-emption.”).
101
Greve, supra note 90, at 289. The Master Settlement Agreement was a deal reached
between the attorneys general of forty-six states and U.S. tobacco manufacturers, providing
for payment in damages to the states. Id. at 287. No state legislator ever voted for the
agreement, which amounts to a tax on smokers, nor did Congress ever approve the
agreement. Id. Federal courts have uniformly rejected Compact Clause claims against the
Master Settlement Agreement. Id.
102
Muller, supra note 90, at 390. The Council of State Governments is a body that
monitors all current interstate compacts. Id.
103
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S 452, 477 (1978).
104
WIECEK, supra note 12, at 18; see also infra notes 105–24 and accompanying text.
99

100
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Virginia’s constitution.105
The intellectual origins of republican
government run much deeper, from Ancient Greece to sixteenth-century
Florence, to seventeenth century England.106 Article IV, section 4 of the
U.S. Constitution, which contains the Guarantee Clause, provides that:
“[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government.”107
What exactly the expansive language “republican form of
government” means has been the focus of debate since the Guarantee
WIECEK, supra note 12, at 15. Jefferson recognized that territory claimed by Virginia
would eventually become independent. Id. According to Jefferson, a requisite for the
formation of new colonies was “that the States so formed shall be distinct Republican States
and be admitted Members of the Federal Union having the same Rights of Sovereignty
Freedom and Independence as the other States.” Id. at 16. Jefferson also drafted a lateraborted ordinance for the Northwest Territory that required its “respective governments
[to] be in republican forms, and shall admit no person to be a citizen who holds any
hereditary title.” Id. Subsequently, a republican government clause found its way into the
Northwest Ordinance drafted by Nathan Dane for the Confederation Congress, which
granted a “broad guarantee of civil liberty” and required that “the constitution and
government, so to be formed, shall be republican, and in conformity to the principles
contained in these articles.” Id. at 17. This broad grant of liberty included civil and
religious liberty, “which form the basis whereon these republics[,] their laws and
constitutions, are erected.” Id. Further, Confederation Congress included in the ordinance
habeas corpus, jury trial, due process, inviolability of contracts, public schools, just dealings
with Indians, federal supremacy, and exclusion of slavery. Id. However, this broad
definition of republican government was not necessarily accepted by all colonial
Americans and was not the universally perceived basis for the inclusion of the Guarantee
Clause in the U.S. Constitution.
See infra notes 107–24 (discussing the various
understandings of republican government).
106
See generally J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975). Madison found inspiration in
David Hume’s contemplation of a “republican form of government” in his essay, Idea of
Perfect Commonwealth. RAKOVE, supra note 20, at 19. Concerning representation, David
Hume says:
The lower sort of people and small proprietors are good judges
enough of one not very distant from them in rank or habitation; and
therefore, in their parochial meetings, will probably chuse the best, or
nearly the best representative: But they are wholly unfit for countymeetings, and for electing into the higher offices of the republic. Their
ignorance gives the grandees an opportunity of deceiving them.
David Hume, Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth, in ESSAYS MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY
VOL. 2 487 (1882).
107
The full text of Article IV, section 4 reads: “The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them
against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. This
article contains three clauses: the “Guarantee Clause,” the “Invasion Clause,” and the
“Domestic Violence” clause. Id. The Guarantee Clause is distinct from the other two
clauses, and yet, its narrative has been tied to them in its common law history by their
proximity. See, e.g., WIECEK, supra note 12, at 104, 109 (relating how President John Tyler
would only interfere with a threat to Rhode Island if there was armed insurrection).
105
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Clause’s inception.108 John Adams admitted in 1807 that he did not
believe any man would ever understand the Guarantee Clause.109
Maybe the clearest explanation of republican government was
articulated by James Madison in the Federalist Papers as a representative
democracy with an absolute prohibition on titles of nobility.110
“[R]epublic” elicits the welfare of the people—the public good—as the
object of primary concern for rulers; a republic is a state that belongs to
the people, not the crown.111 The federal government was not to be a
monarchy; the power to govern would not remain with vested interests
transmitted through time to those with familial or related interests.112
The dread of a monarchy was so pervasive that when rumors circulated
during the Convention that a European family might be given power or
George Washington made King, the convention broke its silence to the
outside world to reassure that they were definitely not considering a
king.113
While Americans generally agreed that republican government
meant the absence of monarchy or hereditary rule, it also meant the
absence of direct democracy to those organizing the federal

Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third
Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 23 (1988); see also Kristin Feeley, Comment, Guaranteeing a
Federally Elected President, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1427, 1436–37 (2009) (footnotes omitted) (“The
Guarantee Clause has been read to prohibit direct democracy, require campaign finance
reform, protect individual rights, protect political rights, mandate wealth
redistribution[,] . . . limit governmental power, and require a system of checks and
balances.”).
109
WIECEK, supra note 12, at 72 (quoting Letter from John Adams to Mercy Warren (July
20, 1807)). The quote continues, “[t]he word [republic] is so loose and indefinite that
successive predominant factions will put glosses and constructions upon it as different as
light and darkness.” Id.
110
THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 191 (James Madison).
111
See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 55–56
(1969) (quoting Thomas Paine and Edmund Pendleton).
112
See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
320–22 (1987) (recounting the concern that an “enterprising Citizen” would establish a
monarchy and spread his ideas from state to state and the consequent need for the
Guarantee Clause); North Carolina Ratification Convention Journal (July 30, 1788),
CONSOURCE, http://www.consource.org/index.asp?bid=582&documentid=72849 (last
visited Oct. 21, 2010) (discussing the Guarantee Clause as a means of preventing any state
from establishing a monarchy or aristocracy).
113
PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 14. But see Letter, Thomas Jefferson to James Madison 15 Mar.
1879, THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/
documents/v1ch14s49.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2010) (discussing the impossibility of a
monarchy ever being established in the states because the younger generation was so
learned in republicanism).
108
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government.114 In Federalist No. 10, James Madison argued that a
republican government would protect encroachment upon minority
rights by majority rule.115 It would do this by having people elect
Thus, while the
representatives who would make the laws.116
“fundamental maxim of republican government . . . requires that the
sense of the majority should prevail,” popular sovereignty would be
channeled through an agency concept of government: “the people are
the principals, their elected representatives the agents chosen to carry
out the popular will.”117 A republican government, while deriving all of
its power from “the great body of people,” was to be a “government of
laws, not of men.”118 In this light, the Guarantee Clause would also,
beyond preventing monarchy, help to prevent popular uprisings that
might threaten the stability of a state government under attack.119
The meaning of the Guarantee Clause takes on a different hue from
the perspective of someone hesitant to ratify a new National Constitution
WIECEK, supra note 12, at 18 (“Republican government was thought to be an
alternative to these extremes, a middle course between the Scylla of tyranny and the
Charybdis of anarchy.”).
115
Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO.
L. REV. 849, 868 (1994).
116
Id.
117
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton); WIECEK, supra note 12, at 23. Embodied
in the Virginia Declaration of Rights was the notion that “[a]ll power is vested in, and
consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates are their trustees and servants, and
at all times amenable to them.” Id.
118
THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison); WIECEK, supra note 12, at 25. Furthermore,
[o]n the principles of government, a broad consensus reigned.
Government existed for the good of the many, and to protect the
liberty, property, and equal rights of the citizen. The idea that
representation would help the government to determine the common
good was commonplace, and so was the belief that the separation of
powers was essential to the protection of rights.
RAKOVE, supra note 20, at 19.
119
See, e.g., Draft Sketch of Constitution by Edmund Randolph (July 26, 1787), CONSOURCE,
http://www.consource.org/index.asp?bid=582&documentid=69084 (last visited Jan. 10,
2010) (“The guarantee is . . . to prevent the establishment of any government, not
republican; . . . to protect each state against internal commotion; and . . . against external
invasion. . . . But this guarantee shall not operate (in the last Case) without an application
from the legislature of a state.”); see also Ann M. Burkhart, The Constitutional Underpinnings
of Homelessness, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 211, 241–42, n.280 (2003) (discussing Shay’s Rebellion and
other popular uprisings by debtors and the poor as a motivation for the rich landowners to
hold a convention that would allow for a strong central government to be established in
order to protect their property interests; “Shays’ Rebellion confirm[ed] [the constitutional
delegates’] worst fears about the populace”) (citing Michael Parenti, The Constitution as an
Elitist Document, in HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION? 39, 43 (1980)). The Virginia
Plan for a Constitution incorporated a guarantee of republican government in response to
two fears sweeping the nation: rebellious popular mobs and monarchy. Merritt, supra note
108, at 29.
114
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that would greatly change the political landscape by taking away powers
formerly held by each of the states.120 In the Pennsylvania ratification
convention, the alarm expressed by some delegates that an all-powerful
federal government would quash state sovereignty was pacified by
reference to the Guarantee Clause.121 In Massachusetts, in response to
similar fears, it was said that, “as the United States guarantee to each
State a Republican form of government; the State governments were as
effectually secured, as though this Constitution should never be in
force.”122 The same scenario, fears of a tyrannical federal government
assuaged by the Guarantee Clause, played out in Maryland, New Jersey,
and New York.123 While the National Constitution enshrined republican
principles for the federal government, the stability of the new nation was
seen as dependent on its member states freely exercising these same
principles.124
The ambiguity surrounding the clause and the expansive notion of
republicanism prevents contemporary academics from completely
unpacking its full meaning.125 What is true for scholarly works has been
and remains true for the Supreme Court.126 In New York v. United States,
See RAKOVE, supra note 20, at 16 (“It is entirely possible—even probable, indeed almost
certain—that the intentions of the framers and the understandings of the ratifiers and their
electors diverged in numerous ways, on points both major and minor.”).
121
See, e.g., Jasper Yeates’ Notes of the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (November 30,
1787), CONSOURCE, http://www.consource.org/index.asp?bid=582&documentid=1891
(last visited Jan. 10, 2010) (stating that the objection was made that the constitution would
“vest Congress with too large and dangerous state powers”). The answer to this objection
was:
Candor and the character of the Federal Convention forbid the idea.
The work does not justify the remark. But it has been shown if the
state governments fail, so must the federal government.
The
Representatives must be chosen by persons voting for the most
numerous branch of the state legislature. The state legislatures must
choose the Senate and appoint Electors to choose a President. The
judicial power depends on the Senate. The 4th section of the 4th
Article guarantees a republican form of government to each state (read
it).
Id.
122
Newspaper Report of the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (January 24, 1788),
CONSOURCE,
http://www.consource.org/index.asp?bid=582&documentid=5038
(last
visited Jan. 10, 2010).
123
Merritt, supra note 108, at 33–35.
124
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison) (pointing to the guarantee of republican
government for the states as decisive proof of the republican nature of the National
Constitution).
125
See Merritt, supra note 108, at 23 (“[N]o single scholarly work can capture the full
meaning of ‘republican government.’”).
126
See infra text accompanying notes 127–39 (giving the history of Supreme Court
jurisprudence regarding the Guarantee Clause).
120
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Justice O’Connor highlighted that the Guarantee Clause has not often
been cited in Supreme Court holdings.127 This is largely because of the
political question doctrine that has been entwined with the Guarantee
Clause ever since Luther v. Borden in 1849 where the Court refused to
decide which of two Rhode Island governments was legitimate.128 The
political question doctrine holds that some questions of constitutional
127
505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992) (holding that the Constitution’s Guarantee Clause was not
violated by provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, which provided
monetary incentives for compliance by states with a federal regulatory scheme and also
provided for denial of access to disposal sites for failure to meet deadlines; under both
provisions, states retained the ability to set their legislative agendas and state government
officials remained accountable to local electorate).
128
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 1–2 (1849); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 51, at 78 (recounting
the facts of Luther and the Court’s approach to the case). In 1842, the people of Rhode
Island had not yet drafted or ratified their own state constitution, but were instead legally
governed by a royal charter granted by King Charles II in 1663. WIECEK, supra note 12, at
86. The charter restricted suffrage to freeholders—those owning $134 of real property—
and determined the number of representatives each town could have. Id. Urbanization
and population growth had created disenfranchisement and malapportionment, which
were in turn aggravated by ethnic and religious tensions. Id. at 87–88. The Rhode Island
General Assembly operating under the Charter would not concede to demanded changes
and so a “People’s Convention” was held. Id. at 90–91. Both the People’s Convention and
the General Assembly submitted constitutions for ratification; the People’s was ratified
14,000 to 52 and the Assembly’s was rejected 8689 to 8013. Id. at 91. A crisis soon emerged
and the General Assembly passed a law outlawing participation in the Dorrite government.
Id. at 95. When Martin Luther broke the law by serving as a moderator for Dorrite
Elections, Luther Borden—a freeholder—and other freeholders broke into Martin Luther’s
home. Id. at 113–15. Luther filed a trespass action against Borden which the Court framed
as an issue about which government was legitimate. Id. By the time Chief Justice Taney
published his decision, the Dorrite government had been defunct for seven years. Id. at
123–24. Any Rhode Islanders who might have once supported the now defunct Dorrite
government had long since acquiesced to life under the Freeholder government and had
recognized it as exclusively legitimate. Id. at 118–19. If the Court were to have ruled that
the Freeholder government was illegitimate, then all of the laws passed by it, all of the
taxes collected by it, all of the salaries paid by it, all of the criminals sentenced, and every
act done by it would have been illegal. Id. In dicta, Chief Justice Taney addressed the
Guarantee Clause:
Under this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to decide
what government is the established one in a State. For as the United
States guarantee to each State a republican government, Congress
must necessarily decide what government is established in the State
before it can determine whether it is republican or not. And when the
senators and representatives of a State are admitted into the councils of
the Union, the authority of the government under which they are
appointed, as well as its republican character, is recognized by the
proper constitutional authority. And its decision is binding on every
other department of the government, and could not be questioned in a
judicial tribunal.
WIECEK, supra note 12, at 121–22. Although this was dicta, it was cited as the holding by
subsequent courts. Id. at 122.
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law are non-justiciable because they are best resolved by the political
branches of government.129 This Note does not address the legal
arguments in support of applying the political question doctrine, but
instead presumes what the Court has said in times past: it should be the
“province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”130
It has been argued that in Luther, Justice Taney did not utilize the
Guarantee Clause in his holding, but only in dicta.131 Regardless, Justice
Taney’s dicta has been rendered into Luther’s holding by subsequent
courts with the result that all Guarantee Clause suits were held
categorically non-justiciable for over fifty years.132 In 1910, one year
before Luther’s holding gutted Guarantee Clause jurisprudence, the
Court recognized the Guarantee Clause as protecting state sovereignty
when it ruled in Coyle v. Smith that Congress could not restrict
Oklahoma’s placement of its capital.133 The Court said that locating a
capital is “essentially and peculiarly [a] state power[].”134
In the early 1960s, the Court removed the absolute barrier to cases
brought under the Guarantee Clause, but the Court did not employ the
clause in any of its holdings.135 In 1991, the Court decided Gregory v.
Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the ‘Political Question’, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031,
1031 (1984). Erwin Chemerinsky notes that the Court usually dismisses Guarantee Clause
claims with single sentences such as, “[a]s to the guaranty to every state of a republican
form of government, it is well settled that the questions arising under [this clause] are
political, not judicial, in character, and thus for the consideration of the Congress and not
the courts.” Chemerinsky, supra note 115, at 849. Beyond the Guarantee Clause, the
political question doctrine has applied to only five other areas: the process for ratifying
constitutional amendments, impeachment and removal of officials from office, foreign
policy decision making, the training of state national guards, and decisions of national
political parties. Id. at 853.
130
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
131
WIECEK, supra note 12, at 120. The Court held the Freeholder government legitimate
by virtue of the Rhode Island judicial system’s ratification through conduct—since the
Rhode Island courts had “construed the laws and the constitution of the state, it was
binding on federal courts.” Id.
132
Luther, 48 U.S. at 42 (holding claims brought under the Guarantee Clause nonjusticiable). It was over fifty years later in 1912 in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Oregon that the Court definitively interpreted Luther as barring actions brought under the
Guarantee Clause. 223 U.S. 118, 149 (1911); Chemerinsky, supra note 115, at 862. Fifty years
later, this absolute barrier was removed. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962) (removing
the absolute barrier to justiciability formerly posed by the political question doctrine).
133
221 U.S. 559, 568 (1910).
134
Id. at 565.
135
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 556 (1964); Baker, 369 U.S. at 228–29 (removing the
absolute barrier to justiciability formerly posed by the political question doctrine). While
removing the political question doctrine from actions challenging the constitutionality of
state actions, the Court refrained from applying the Guarantee Clause but instead upheld a
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge. Redish, supra note 129, at 1031 n.1,
1033. In New York v. United States, Justice O’Connor recognized that Reynolds opened the
129
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Ashcroft wherein Justice O’Connor bolstered the Court’s opinion in dicta
with the Guarantee Clause by upholding Missouri’s determination of
qualifications for government officials.136 She said that
States [have the authority] to determine the
qualifications of their most important government
officials. It is an authority that lies at “the heart of
representative government.” It is a power reserved to
the States under the Tenth Amendment and guaranteed
them by that provision of the Constitution under which
the United States “guarantee[s] to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government.”137
In New York v. United States, also decided in 1991, Justice O’Conner
again recognized the possible viability of the Guarantee Clause; she set
out two criteria by which the federal government may violate the
Guarantee Clause: (1) if the states lose the ability to set their legislative
agendas, and (2) if state government officials can no longer remain
accountable to the local electorate.138 This test had not been met in New
York, so the Court instead relied in its ruling upon the Tenth
Amendment.139
As of the writing of this Note, Guarantee Clause jurisprudence is in
stasis; there are no absolute barriers to its use by the political question
doctrine, but years of disuse have made it a functional nullity.140 It is
way for some cases brought under the Guarantee Clause to be justiciable. 505 U.S. 144, 186
(1992).
136
501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991) (holding that Missouri’s mandatory retirement requirement
for judges does not violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967). The Court
said that a federal law will only be applicable to important state government activities if
Congress makes clear that it intended such. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 323 (3d 2006) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
137
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 463 (citations omitted).
138
New York, 505 U.S. at 185–86.
139
Id. The Tenth Amendment holds that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Court similarly used the Tenth
Amendment in the case Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935–36 (1997) (holding that
under the Tenth Amendment, Congress cannot utilize state executive officers for its own
purposes). Subsequently, the Court heard Reno v. Condon in which it upheld a federal law
in the face of a Tenth Amendment challenge. 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000). The Court
distinguished this case from New York and Printz because the law in question, the Drivers
Privacy Protection Act, was a “prohibition of conduct, not an affirmative mandate.”
PRINCIPLES, supra note 136, at 325–26. This case follows Tenth Amendment jurisprudence
established in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), a case
that has never been overruled. Id. at 322, 326.
140
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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possible that a challenge to NPV legislation may arouse this “sleeping
giant,” a possibility that is contextually explored in the following
analysis.141
III. ANALYSIS
If enough states legislatively adopt the NPV, the Supreme Court will
face the unique challenge of having to reconcile two previously
unassociated constitutional provisions.142 These two constitutional
provisions, immediately at play when enough states have adopted the
NPV, are Article II, section 1, pararagraph 2, and the Compact Clause. 143
Within that context, this Analysis demonstrates that the text of Article II
in an unsophisticated and very blunt way eschews federal
Before proffering an exposition of congressional
interference.144
impotence in determining how states choose their electors, this Part
concludes that while policy arguments have no bearing on the legal
arguments at play, when considered, policy rationale supports the
NPV.145 Specifically, this Analysis will examine, as a policy argument,
the single caveat to state plenary power—the notion of equal protection
(a principle that is constitutionally precluded by Article II from being
fully applied by the federal government to the presidential election) and
conclude that a paradox antithetical to the moving spirit behind and
within the Constitution would arise by federal interference with states
wishing to enable one person one vote through the NPV.146 Finally, this
Analysis will consider the possibility that the Court will modify current
Compact Clause jurisprudence in a way that the NPV could face
heightened scrutiny.147 With this backdrop, the Contribution tackles the
question of the Guarantee Clause’s viability for settling the differences
between Article II, section 1 and the Compact Clause.148

WIECEK, supra note 12, at 290.
See Muller, supra note 90, at 390 (discussing that there has never been an interstate
compact regarding presidential elections because they are governed by Article II, section 1).
143
Id.
144
See infra Part III.A (discussing the same).
145
See infra Part III.B–C (discussing the same).
146
See infra Part III.C (discussing the same). In other words, one person, one vote cannot
be implemented and enforced by the federal government in an interstate manner; only
within each state is one person, one vote applicable. Id.
147
See infra Part III.D (discussing the same).
148
See infra Part IV (discussing the same).
141
142
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A. Article II, Section 1 Gives the States Complete, Unqualified, Absolute, and
Full Plenary Power
If James Madison’s notes on the Constitutional Convention are
accurate, there was no debate about how state legislatures would
appoint electors.149 Instead of giving the states policy guidelines or a
rationale to consider or follow, the Framers elected to give the states a
power through which state legislatures could exercise their own
discretion.150 The lack of guidelines in Article II’s grant of power to the
state legislatures and the derivative flexibility bestowed as a
consequence have borne the test of time rather well despite many efforts
to change it; the presidential election process has only been amended
The Twelfth
once with passage of the Twelfth Amendment.151
149
PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 45. The Framers did not debate whether state legislatures
“would appoint the electors themselves, require that they be chosen by popular vote in
districts, or provide for popular vote statewide.” Id. Further, the Framers did not even
debate the real role of electors. Id. The biggest debate at the convention about presidential
elections concerned the contingency plan. Id. at 47. Initially, the Senate was to choose the
president if no candidate received a majority of the electoral votes, but some delegates
feared the power that this would give to the Senate whose members were then chosen by
state legislators. Id. at 48.
150
See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 28 (1892). Regarding this power, Chief Justice
Fuller said:
The Journal of the Convention discloses that propositions that the
President should be elected by “the citizens of the United States,” or by
the “people,” or “by electors to be chosen by the people of the several
states,” instead of by the Congress, were voted down, as was the
proposition that the President should be “chosen by electors appointed
for that purpose by the legislatures of the States,” . . . . The final result
seems to have reconciled contrariety of views by leaving it to the state
legislatures to appoint directly by joint ballot or concurrent separate
action, or through popular election by districts or by general ticket, or
as otherwise might be directed.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
151
U.S. CONST. amend. XII; see also supra text accompanying note 44 (explaining that ten
percent of all proposed amendments are for Electoral College reform); supra note 45
(explaining the passage of the Twelfth Amendment). With passage of the Twelfth
Amendment, “any semblance” of electors acting as independent agents disappeared, but
not their constitutional prerogative to act independently. PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 121. The
fact that the Electoral College has been so adaptable despite changes in how states choose
electors is a point often made by proponents of the Electoral College. BENNETT, supra note
28, at 58; see also, e.g., Martin Diamond, The Electoral College and the American Idea of
Conspiracy, in AFTER THE PEOPLE VOTE: A GUIDE TO THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 44, 46 (rev.
ed., Walter Berns ed., 1992) (“Not only is [the electoral college] not at all archaic, but one
might say that it is the very model of up-to-date constitutional flexibility. Perhaps no other
feature of the Constitution has had a greater capacity for dynamic historical
adaptiveness.”); George Will, Forward to ROSS, supra note 42, at x (“And today’s electoralvote system is not an 18th-century anachronism. It has evolved, shaping and being shaped
by a large development the Constitution’s Framers did not foresee—the two party
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Amendment did nothing to change the role of electors or the role of state
legislatures in choosing those electors, despite evidence that electors
were not acting independently as had been hoped for by some of the
Framers.152
The opinion in Bush v. Gore reiterates the long-standing plenary
principle of Article II that is unequivocally accepted by the Court.153
While custom may have changed the electoral process from what the
Framers had personally envisioned to popular statewide winner-take-all
elections for electors that may have removed all discretion from electors
and turned the presidential election from a process of wise deliberations
into popular pageantry, custom alone does not have a force capable of
overriding the Constitution: “The State, of course, after granting the
franchise in the special context of Article II, can take back the power to
appoint electors.”154

system.”).
The only other significant change to the electoral-vote process was The Electoral
Count Act of 1887, which provided for a more efficient transmission of electoral votes by a
state’s chief election officer to Congress and which laid out rules for Congress regarding
how to count the electoral votes; again, there was no change in how states can choose their
electors. BENNETT, supra note 28, at 36–37, 116.
152
See supra note 45 (explaining the passage of the Twelfth Amendment). In Federalist
No. 68, Alexander Hamilton, in arguing for adoption of the new constitution, pointed to
the desirability of the immediate election of the president by “men most capable of
analizing [sic] the qualities adapted to the station [of president].” THE FEDERALIST NO. 68
(Alexander Hamilton). He reasoned that, “[a] small number of persons, . . . will be most
likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to so complicated an
investigation.” Id. By the third election, however, electors were already voting along party
lines. BENNETT, supra note 28, at 23–24. By the time of the passage of the Twelfth
Amendment, it was evident that “rather than exercising any real discretion informed by
discussion among electors,” electors were instead “often” casting votes in accordance with
prior commitments. Id. at 23. Even in the first presidential election, Massachusetts electors
cast ballots pursuant to a predetermined vote. “[T]hey had not come to discuss, deliberate
and negotiate.” Id. at 201 n.61 (quoting TADAHISA KURODA, THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH
AMENDMENT 31 (1994)). Today, “the voting of the electors is a formality, predetermined by
the popular vote cast in each state on [election day].” WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CENTENNIAL
CRISIS: THE DISPUTED ELECTION OF 1876, at 3 (2004).
153
531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000). “Whether the electoral college and winner-take-all casting of
electoral votes is a good idea or not has no bearing on the law. Article II, section 1 and the
Twelfth Amendment are the Constitution we have.” Porter v. Bowen, 518 F.3d 1181, 1183–
84 (9th Cir. 2008) (Kleinfeld, J. dissenting).
154
Bush, 531 U.S at 104. The Court explained that state legislators used to choose the
electors but “[h]istory has now favored the voter.” Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at
345 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that the benefit of the Electoral College is the process of
wise deliberations). Some Framers feared popular elections; among the rationale for not
codifying a popular national election in the Constitution, there was a fear of the ignorance
of the American people at large, of how easily they could be manipulated by, for instance,
the Order of the Cincinnati. PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 42.
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There is nothing ambiguous about the plenary power given to state
legislatures and there is no sophisticated argument to make concerning
this power beyond the fact that they have full power.155 State
legislatures can choose any agent as the means of selecting state
electors.156 Literally any method within the scope of federal equal
protection law can be chosen by state legislatures; governors could be
designated to choose electors, a state’s supreme court could be given the
honor, or even a game of chance might be drawn up—chimps could be
given darts and a board of nominees covered with the pictures of
potential electors.157 That there is currently no great variety in the
methods used by state legislators to choose electors—popular elections
are used in every state—merely supports the proposition that state
legislators are self-interested individuals belonging to political parties
comprised of interests and agendas.158 Legislators are politicians who
want to stay in office and who will maintain popular voting because they
are ultimately accountable to the people.159 Ruling political parties will
maintain the winner-take-all system out of a sense of “political selfpreservation.”160
See supra text accompanying note 57 (stating that state legislatures have plenary
power when choosing electors).
156
See supra text accompanying note 57 (noting that the state legislature has plenary
power when choosing its electors).
157
See, e.g., KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 38 (quoting the Colorado Constitution, which
guarantees the right of the people to vote for presidential electors). State constitutions,
however, may limit or preclude some, any, or all of these methods. McPherson v. Blacker,
146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892).
158
PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 77. Peirce posits two reasons for the prevalence of a popular
vote under a general ticket system. Id. First, over time, American sentiment has favored
direct participation where the people, rather than state legislatures, would have the
privilege of choosing presidential electors. Id. Secondly, the general ticket system favored
the ruling political class by allowing them to secure all the state’s electoral votes for the
national candidate in consideration for power, prestige, and patronage. Id. On the other
hand, minority interests in the state legislature preferred a district system to protect their
voice in the process, but were impotent to implement such a plan. Id.; see also, e.g., supra
notes 30–32 and accompanying text (discussing the general ticket or winner-take-all
system); infra note 172 (introducing Thomas Jefferson’s argument that choosing electors by
district would be best only when all states choose this method).
159
See PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 77 (explaining that the advancement of democratic ideals in
the general populace means that state legislators elected by the populace have to allow for
the popular vote in presidential elections).
160
Id. at 78. It has been noted that Maine and Nebraska do in fact utilize the district
system. Supra text accompanying note 47. “In all 13 presidential elections in which the
district system has been used by Maine and Nebraska, the presidential candidate carrying
the state has carried all of the state’s congressional districts.” KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at
7 n.17. Maine and Nebraska have respectively only two and three districts, which is to say
that they are small. Id. Being small, they are more easily dominated by a single party,
which makes their district system the functional equivalent of a winner-take-all system. Id.
155
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Bush v. Gore illustrated the power of the legislature to appoint
Florida’s electors.161 According to the Court, so great was the power
granted to the state legislature for exercising its Article II task, not even
the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Florida constitution
could take away the power of the legislature.162 If Justice Stevens’
dissenting interpretation prevailed, it would not be the Florida
legislature that has full authority in Electoral College matters, but the
State of Florida as defined by Florida’s constitution.163 Either the Florida
legislature has plenary power or Florida’s legislature is constrained only
by the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Florida
Constitution; either way, Congress does not have the power to interfere
in this process because it is the State of Florida that has ultimate
authority in exercising its Article II prerogative.164
Florida’s ultimate authority in this arena is tempered by only one
mainstay of the American justice system: equal protection.165 But equal
protection and one person, one vote is foreclosed from being fully
employed in the presidential election process by the federal government
because of Article II, which means invoking equal protection is
tantamount to making a policy argument, not a legal argument.166 The
next Part discusses what bearing, if any, policy arguments should have
on state adoption of the NPV.
B. Policy Arguments Have No Bearing on the Constitutional Exercise by
State Legislatures of Their Plenary Power, However Comma . . .
Another way of saying that states have plenary power regarding the
Electoral College is to say that fairness is of no consequence, legal
policies do not matter, and the original intent of our Founders does not
necessarily carry much weight.167 For example, a consequence of the
winner-take-all system is that states do not choose to appoint electors in
a way favorable to many Founders’ opinions of what constituted
republican government.168 Madison wrote that “the district system was
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112–13 (2000).
Id.
163
Id. at 123 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
164
See supra text accompanying notes 66–67 (explicating the difference between policy
and power, and the fact that states have the power when choosing electors regardless of
policy considerations).
165
See infra Part III.C (discussing equal protection as it pertains to voting).
166
See infra Part III.C (providing a discussion of equal protection as it pertains to voting).
167
See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text (discussing the same); infra note 172
(highlighting how Thomas Jefferson’s conception of how the Electoral College should work
does not match the reality of how it does in fact work).
168
PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 76.
161
162
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mostly, if not exclusively, in view when the Constitution was framed
This view was personally supported by such
and adopted.”169
constitutional architects as Jefferson, Madison, and Hamilton.170
Politicians themselves, the Framers had a difficult time agreeing on a
system that could withstand corruption, but they thought they had
settled on something worthy of the task; Alexander Hamilton
proclaimed that corruption in the presidential election process would be
impossible due in large part to the “transient existence” of the electors.171
Despite their beliefs that the Electoral College foreclosed corruption
and that the district system was best, Jefferson and Madison both
adopted a Machiavellian approach to Virginia’s electoral votes in order
to vanquish their political foes.172 Jefferson and Madison, while not
favoring the role politics and the emerging two parties were playing in
the appointment of electors, recognized that a state’s interest would be
emasculated by adhering to the district system in the face of other states
using the less democratic winner-take-all system.173 They maneuvered to
change Virginia’s system temporarily, believing that a constitutional
amendment giving uniformity to the presidential elector process would
pass sooner than later.174 The tenor of these comments, that the Electoral
College does not produce results consistent with higher ideals but must
be accepted until there is a constitutional amendment, has played out
through America’s history.175 Of particular concern has been the
Id. (quoting James Madison).
Id.
171
Id. at 52. The most frequently cited argument in favor of the Electoral College during
the ratification debates was that it would prevent “heats and ferments . . . tumult and
disorder . . . cabal, intrigue and corruption.” Id. (quoting Alexander Hamilton). For
example, the President was not to be chosen by Congress—an idea approved four separate
times during the Convention—because of the fear of “a temptation on the side of the
executive to intrigue with the legislature for a reappointment.” Id. at 33, 39–40. Those
favoring executive independence did not want the president to be the mere instrument of
Congress. Id. at 40. Further, if Congress chose the president, foreign powers would more
easily intrigue and hold sway over American politics. Id.
172
Id. at 66. Jefferson said, “[a]ll agree that an election by districts would be best if it
could be general, but while ten states choose either by their legislatures or by a general
ticket, it is folly or worse for the other six not to follow.” Id. Jefferson wrote this in
connection to Madison’s bill to change the Virginia electoral system where Federalists had
made inroads. Id.
173
Id. at 66.
174
Id.
175
See, e.g., New v. Pelosi, No. 08 Civ. 9055(AKH), 2008 WL 4755414 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29,
2008) (“Whatever the merits, Plaintiff's remedy lies in the constitutional amendment
process, not the courts.”); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 44–45 (1892) (holding that
Michigan’s legislature could change Michigan’s presidential electoral process regardless of
any political motivations underlying the decision); see also supra note 45 (highlighting the
problems of the House contingency plan and the faithless elector).
169
170
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influence that states, by the methods they utilize to choose their electors,
have on other states desiring to use alternative methods for choosing
electors.176 Justice Story addressed this in observing, “it has been
thought desirable by many statesmen to have the Constitution amended
so as to provide for a uniform mode of choice by the people.”177
As a consequence, any and all non-constitutional arguments against
the NPV, i.e. any and all policy arguments against the NPV, are nonsequiturs.178 However, policy arguments against the NPV cannot be
completely ignored. One argument posits that the NPV could allow
eleven states acting in concert to determine the President.179 This
argument presumes the NPV is contrary to the interests of small states
and that the Electoral College as it now operates helps to protect those
interests.180 However, with the small state of Hawaii (four electoral
votes), as well as Maryland (ten votes), having already ratified the NPV,
the plan will now require at the bare minimum thirteen states as of this
writing before it can take effect.181 A student Note in the Harvard Law
Review amply demonstrates that the nearly ubiquitous winner-take-all
system does not clearly benefit small or large states.182 On the contrary,
the Electoral College already allows for the far-out possibility that a mere
twenty-seven percent of the population could determine the next
President.183
Another policy argument against the NPV is that using the
constitutional amendment process would be more democratic.184 This
would produce a permanent change and would ultimately be more
See PEIRCE supra note 2, at 132.
McPherson, 146 U.S. at 33 (quoting Justice Story).
178
See supra notes 57–67 (explaining the plenary power inherent to state legislators
regarding presidential elector appointments).
179
See KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 380 (citing Tara Ross’ critique that “11 colluding
states” could impose the NPV on the country).
180
Top National Popular Vote (Koza) Myths: Top Six Myths Upon Which the Koza Scheme Is
Based, THE AMY OLIVER SHOW (Mar. 26, 2009), http://blog.amyolivershow.com/topnational-popular-vote-koza-myths/; Bob Williams, In Defense of the Electoral College: The
National Popular Vote Movement Threatens a Vital Part of Our Republic, ALEC POLICY FORUM,
http://www.alec.org/am/pdf/Electoral_College_Defense.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2010).
181
See supra note 73 (delineating the states who have adopted the NPV); 2008 Presidential
Election, U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoralcollege/2008/election-results.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2010) (providing data on the
popular and electoral vote in 2008).
182
See Rethinking the Electoral College Debate, supra note 44, at 2526 (using statistics to
clearly demonstrate that the winner-take-all system does not benefit large states or small
states).
183
Id. at 2532. Alternatively, the eleven biggest states, home to fifty-six percent of the
population, could theoretically determine the President under the current regime. KOZA ET
AL., supra note 17, at 380.
184
KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 379.
176
177
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damaging to the Electoral College because it would be legislation
binding on all states, whereas adoption of the NPV is within the
discretion of each individual state.185 Yet another argument suggests
that the NPV would work against our two-party system.186 Although the
wisdom of a two-party system is debatable, it is not something that is
constitutionally prescribed.187
There are practical concerns regarding the NPV.188 These include
that the NPV would result in recount chaos, which would prolong the
resolution of a presidential election.189 Also, only big urban centers
would matter, candidates would campaign only in media markets, and
campaign spending would skyrocket.190 These are all worthy concerns,
and as of now, unknowns.
While there is no precedent allowing for either Congress or the
Supreme Court to invalidate the NPV through policy considerations,
policy arguments certainly have a role in influencing state legislators
who may have to vote for or against the NPV. Assuming that some of
these problems would really manifest themselves, they then become
logistical concerns that should be weighed against policy rationale in
support of the NPV. There is one over-arching policy rationale in favor
of the NPV—equal protection, which is discussed next.191
C. Equal Protection Is in All Instances but One a Legal Argument, and Thus a
Strong Policy Argument
There is one and only one caveat to the specific plenary power
reserved for the states in Article II, section 1, regarding elections, a
limitation which has been described by the Court in the following way:
“When a State exercises power wholly within the
domain of state interest, it is insulated from federal
judicial review. But such insulation is not carried over
when state power is used as an instrument for
circumventing a federally protected right.”
The
conception of political equality from the Declaration of
Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the

Id. at 381.
Broder, supra note 87.
187
See generally U.S. CONST. (stating nowhere the constitutional requirement of a twoparty system).
188
See infra text accompanying notes 189–90 (discussing the same).
189
Williams, supra note 180.
190
Id.
191
See infra Part III.C (discussing the same).
185
186
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Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments
can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.192
In the instance of voting, federally protected rights have been almost
exclusively concerned with equal protection.193 The only constitutional
duty owed by a state legislature when designating the people as its agent
to choose its presidential electors is that of extending equal protection to
those voters of its own state.194
To say that equal protection is the only constitutional duty a state
has when implementing popular voting procedures is also to say that
equal protection is extremely important in our modern understanding of
representative democracy—it is the only exception to state power in this
arena.195 The equal protection now currently afforded voters has not
always existed.196 Time and forces have changed our understanding of
192
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339,
347 (1960)).
193
See Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE: C.R. DIVISION,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/voting/intro/intro.php (last visited Dec. 23, 2010). Other
laws enforced address voter registration when citizens obtain drivers licenses, voter
registration for overseas citizens, and minimum standards for voting. The Statutes We
Enforce, UNITED STATES DEP’T JUSTICE, C.R. DIVISION, http://www.justice.gov/crt/voting/
overview.php (last visited Dec. 23, 2010). The Federal Election Commission handles
campaign finance laws. Administering and Enforcing Campaign Finance Laws, FED. ELECTION
COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2010).
194
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000). Also included in equal protection, i.e. nondiscrimination, is the freedom of association for minority parties, a right guaranteed under
the First Amendment. See King v. Willis, 333 F. Supp. 670, 675 (D. Del. 1971) (articulating
that the right to vote can be burdened by undue burdens being placed upon political
parties seeking to register presidential elector candidates); see also supra text accompanying
notes 68–71 (highlighting the importance of equal protection in presidential elections).
195
See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text (articulating the same).
196
See supra notes 70–71 (listing amendments that guarantee equal protection, which had
theretofore been unprotected). Voting at the time of the revolution was determined by
property ownership; each state had different requirements for how much value/net yield
the land was required to have. PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 37. Some states required a certain
amount of taxes to be paid. Id. Vermont was the first state to allow all adult males to vote
in 1791—some time before the Constitution mandated such with passage of the Fifteenth
Amendment in 1870. Id. Meanwhile, all adult women could vote in Wyoming as early as
1869—sixty-one years before passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. State Suffrage Laws,
LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/awhhtml/awlaw3/suffrage.
html (last visited Dec. 23, 2010) (providing a .jpg version of “An Act to Grant the Women of
Wyoming Territory the Right of Suffrage, and to Hold Office,” which was approved on
December 10, 1869). States, having the power to choose qualifications for the franchise in
state elections, were also given the same power in choosing qualifications for those who
would vote for House Representatives. PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 38. So, for example, all
adult males in Vermont would vote for Representatives in the House (the state legislator
chose the state’s Senators), while only males owning property would vote for
Representatives from Virginia. Id.
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equality and the franchise so that the Court can conclude that “the
philosophy behind the electoral college . . . . belongs to a bygone day.”197
The effective result is that the Electoral College is an exception to the
exception, a caveat to the caveat; the Court will not hear equal protection
challenges to the Electoral College from individuals or small states or
This is because the fundamental principle of equal
anybody.198
Gray, 372 U.S. at 379 n.8.
See e.g., New v. Pelosi, No. 08 Civ. 9055(AKH), 2008 WL 4755414 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29,
2008) (dismissing summarily plaintiff’s civil rights 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that the Electoral
College diluted the votes of citizens of big states and the votes of women). The pro se
plaintiff presented a sophisticated argument as conceded by the court’s opinion:
Plaintiff argues that the electoral college process created by Article II,
Section 1 and the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution favors states
with smaller populations by granting to their citizens greater
influence, per electoral vote, on the outcome of presidential elections
than it grants to citizens of larger states. For example, by dividing
South Dakota’s number of electoral votes (3) by its 2000 census
population (rounded to 755,000), Plaintiff asserts that a South
Dakotan’s vote has a “value” of 0.0000039, while a New Yorker's vote,
by similar calculation, has a “value” of 0.0000017. Plaintiff then groups
the states into three regions (“Northern/Western liberal/moderate
states,” “Farm/Great Plains states,” and “Southern conservative
states”), calculates the average “value” of votes cast in each region, and
concludes that the two more politically conservative regions wield a
“leveraged advantage” in voting power over the “Northern/Western
liberal/moderate states.” Plaintiff argues that the electoral college, by
creating this advantage, violates the Thirteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments because it derives from a constitutional bargain to
benefit Southern, slaveholding states. Plaintiff further argues that the
electoral college violates the Nineteenth Amendment because, in
penalizing states that tend to vote for Democratic candidates, it
disfavors the voting power of women, who tend to vote Democratic.
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of an order that restrains the
Congress from counting electoral college votes pursuant to 3 U.S.C. § 1
et seq. and instead mandates a national popular vote. Because all of
Plaintiff’s claims rest on the existence and effects of mathematical vote
dilution, I interpret the complaint to allege that the electoral college
violates the “one person, one vote” principle of the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . .
Id.
In 1966, in Delaware v. New York, twelve small states brought a suit against the other
thirty-seven states claiming that the winner-take-all method violated the Equal Protection
clause. Motion for Leave to File Complaint, Complaint and Brief, ¶ XX 385 U.S. 895 (1966)
(No. 28, Original), 1966 WL 100407. The attorney general for Delaware made sophisticated
arguments, two of which were contained in paragraphs six and seven of the complaint:
6. In its actual functioning the state unit system of electing the
President and Vice President is part of an integrated national process.
The interlocking and interdependent features of this national electoral
system cause each state's methods to be affected by all others and give
each state and its citizens a real interest in the electoral methods of

197
198
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protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, through which the Court
has extended protection, does not give the Court power to strike out any
other part of the Constitution, including Article II, section 1.199
If the NPV were successfully challenged in the Supreme Court under
the Compact Clause and if Congress chose not to give its consent, this
would put state legislatures that adopt the NPV in a unique position;
these states would be constitutionally mandated to implement one
person, one vote for all local elections while simultaneously being
prohibited from individually deciding to act in unison to embrace one
person, one vote.200 This is a paradox ultimately antithetical to the spirit
of the Constitution. The majority of amendments to the Post Bill of
Rights Constitution were enacted by the impetus of equal protection.201
Courts have correctly foreclosed equal protection challenges by
individuals regarding the presidential vote.202 And yet by requiring
congressional approval for the NPV, the spirit of equality so prevalent in
the Constitution would fall prey to the gravity of a legal void where

every state. Each state's electoral votes and each individual's popular
vote are subject to impairment, debasement, and dilution by the
methods and procedures of other states.
7. In every election the state unit system abridges the political rights
of substantial numbers of persons by arbitrarily awarding all of the
electoral votes of their state to the candidate receiving a bare plurality
of its popular votes. This occurs without regard to the number of votes
cast for an opponent. 435 of the total of 538 electoral votes correspond
to Representatives and are allocated to states because of their numbers
of persons. Nonetheless, the state unit system frequently allows all of
a state’s votes to be cast for a candidate opposed by as many as 49% of
its voters. Votes cast for the losing candidate within a particular state
are not only discarded at an intermediate stage of the elective process
but are effectively treated as if they had been cast for an opponent.
The barest popular vote plurality and the overwhelming landslide are
converted alike into a unanimous state vote in the national election.
This arbitrary misappropriation of the elective power of substantial
political minorities denies them due process of law and equal
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at *7–8.
199
See New, 2008 WL 4755414 at *1 (summarily dismissing plaintiff’s complaint based
upon Fourteenth Amendment claim that the electoral college violated plaintiff’s equal
protection rights).
200
See supra notes 161–65 and accompanying text (discussing the same).
201
See supra notes 70–71 (listing the Amendments that relate to equal protection and the
right to vote).
202
See, e.g., New, 2008 WL 4755414 (summarily dismissing plaintiff’s complaint based
upon the Fourteenth Amendment claim that the electoral college violated plaintiff’s equal
protection rights).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 [2011], Art. 9

832

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

nothing short of a constitutional amendment would permit states to fully
implement equal protection.203
Allowing only one avenue—the constitutional amendment process—
for full implementation of one person, one vote is a constraint on the
sovereignty of individual states.204 Equal protection is in all cases but
this one a legal argument; here it is a policy argument. But, considering
the legal force equal protection has in all other franchise realms and that
equal protection is only foreclosed by Article II and nothing else, it is a
very strong policy argument in favor of allowing states to enact the
NPV.205 Poignantly, representative democracy is severely discredited
when state legislators are no longer accountable to their constituents.206
In this situation, the federal government would transgress its
constitutional confines by infringing on state sovereignty all the while
acting to contravene the premise that all men and women are born
equal.207
Not all arguments against the NPV are policy arguments.208 One
argument, the challenge of the Compact Clause, is explicitly
constitutional; another argument implicates the overall nature of the
Constitution by claiming that the NPV threatens the federalism inherent
therein.209 There have never been interstate agreements involving the
Electoral College, nor has the Compact Clause ever been applied to
issues involving this Article II power.210 Thus, the NPV and a challenge
to it via the Compact Clause would be unprecedented in Supreme Court
203
See Broder, supra note 87 (arguing that the NPV is an end run around the
constitutional amendment process). It logically follows that if the NPV is held to be
unconstitutional, there are no other means of fully implementing one person, one vote
outside the amendment process.
204
C.f. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (iterating that when the federal
government compels states to regulate, the accountability of elected state representatives is
diminished).
205
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; c.f. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586–87 (1964) (holding that
the superficial resemblance between state apportionment plans and the legislative
representation scheme of the Federal Congress affords no proper basis for sustaining that
plan, since the historical circumstances which gave rise to the congressional system of
representation, arising out of compromise among sovereign States, are unique and without
relevance to the allocation of seats in state legislatures).
206
See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 168 (arguing the same).
207
Cf. id.; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 587 (holding that weighting votes differently according to
where citizens happen to reside is discriminatory).
208
E.g., Muller, supra note 90 (discussing the Compact Clause).
209
See Broder, supra note 87 (arguing that the NPV ignores the fundamental
characteristics of American government: federalism and the two party system); Muller,
supra note 90 (concluding that the NPV violates the Compact Clause). One author posits
that the Guarantee Clause actually guarantees a federally elected President. Feeley, supra
note 108, at 1428.
210
Supra text accompanying notes 99–101.
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history.211 The next Part of this Note addresses how these two
constitutional clauses, potentially colliding for the first time, measure up
to each other.
D. The Compact Clause v. Article II
In one corner, there is the Article II plenary power of the states
establishing the Electoral College.212 This constitutional provision is
limited by the principle of equal protection, but only for locally held
popular elections.213 The states are not required to hold popular
elections for presidential electors.214 The states can designate any
method for determining who its presidential electors will be.215 No state
has ever designated the American people at large to choose its
presidential electors, but there is no Supreme Court precedent
prohibiting states from deciding to choose the American people at large
for this constitutionally mandated task.216
In the other corner, there is the Compact Clause.217 Under current
Compact Clause jurisprudence, the Court looks primarily to actual, not
possible, encroachment on federal sovereignty by compacting states.218
The Court has also said that non-compacting states may suffer
detrimental secondary effects without the Compact Clause necessarily
being violated.219 As Compact Clause jurisprudence now stands, it
seems likely that the NPV would be held constitutional in spite of any
Compact Clause challenge because the NPV does not encroach on the
power of the federal government.220
If the Court decided to apply a horizontal analysis to determine
whether the NPV infringes upon the sovereignty of non-compacting
states, it would likely find that non-compacting states still retain the

211
See supra note 101 (logically stipulating that in the absence of prior compacts
regarding elections, a Compact Clause challenge to NPV would be an issue of first
impression for the Court).
212
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
213
See supra Part III.C (exploring the principle of equal protection as it applies to the
Article II plenary power of the states).
214
See supra Part III.A (discussing the flexibility state legislatures have in deciding how to
choose presidential electors).
215
See supra Part III.A (describing the broad power possessed by the state legislature).
216
See supra Part III.A (noting the broad authority state legislatures maintain over
selecting presidential electors).
217
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
218
Supra text accompanying note 96.
219
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S 452, 477 (1978).
220
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, par. 2 (giving to state legislatures the power to choose
presidential electors).
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ability to choose presidential electors in whichever manner they desire.221
That these non-compacting states might suffer secondary effects would
not necessarily suffice to invalidate the NPV.222 The Constitution
guarantees to the states the power to choose presidential electors, but it
does not guarantee that a state’s presidential electors will have their
candidate elected President.223
Regardless of this initial analysis, Congress could attempt to
interfere by passing a resolution against the NPV, or a state could ask the
Court to invalidate the NPV under a modified Compact Clause
jurisprudence because there is no congressional consent.224 Congress or
the Court might determine that the secondary effects bearing on noncompacting states are egregious enough to seriously consider a Compact

221
See supra Part II.B (discussing the NPV which is not legislation requiring action of noncompacting states).
222
Supra text accompanying note 103. Even a horizontal analysis that looks to how such
an agreement affects non-member states could not pass muster. See U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S
at 477 (stating that the risk of unfairness is independent of the nature and legitimacy of the
compact in question). Non-member state presidential electors who cast their votes contrary
to the national popular vote would merely be in the minority, but that does not mean their
votes would not be counted; it only means that they would lose. See Hendricks, supra note
90, at 226. State legislatures do not need the NPV to choose the national popular vote as the
method for appointing presidential electors; the NPV does not give states a power they do
not already have, it only provides a litmus test by which to gauge when a state can appoint
presidential electors without potentially nullifying any or all of its political clout. See U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (giving to states the power to appoint presidential electors). That
there is pressure upon non-member states is decisive of nothing when it comes to a
constitutional analysis. Hendricks, supra note 90, at 224; c.f. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate
Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 478 (1978). The Supreme Court stated the following:
Moreover, it is not explained how any economic pressure that does
exist is an affront to the sovereignty of nonmember States. Any time a
State adopts a fiscal or administrative policy that affects the programs
of a sister State, pressure to modify those programs may result. Unless
that pressure transgresses the bounds of the Commerce Clause or the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, it is not clear how our
federal structure is implicated. Appellants do not argue that an
individual State’s decision to apportion nonbusiness income—or to
define business income broadly, as the regulations of the Commission
actually do—touches upon constitutional strictures. This being so, we
are not persuaded that the same decision becomes a threat to the
sovereignty of other States if a member State makes this decision upon
the Commission’s recommendation.
Id. (citation omitted). Thus, it follows that unless the pressure on non-member states
transgresses some other constitutional bounds, there is no cause of action.
223
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 cl. 2 (giving state legislatures the power to choose
presidential electors).
224
Schleifer, supra note 90, at 749. The NPV could be the straw that breaks the camel’s
back, the camel being current Compact Clause jurisprudence. Id.
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Clause challenge.225 Thus, if Compact Clause jurisprudence is revised,
the Compact and Guarantee Clauses might appear more evenly
matched.
It is certain that if Congress tried to interfere with state legislative
adoption of the NPV, there would be a Tenth Amendment argument, as
set out in New York v. United States, that Congress cannot compel states to
legislate in a certain manner.226 In Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Court had
recourse to the Tenth Amendment.227 The Tenth Amendment was also
invoked in New York v. United States and again in Printz v. United
States.228 Many federalism cases, if not most, involve the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.229
However, Tenth Amendment jurisprudence is both erratic and beyond
the scope of this Note.230
While it is true that if the Court relied on the Tenth Amendment to
find the NPV constitutional, there would be no need to look any further,
nothing regarding the Tenth Amendment can be so certain.231 If the
Court were asked to invalidate the NPV and Congress had not moved to
counteract the NPV legislation, then the Tenth Amendment would not
be an applicable defense for states that have adopted NPV legislation.232
This is so because there would have been no federal government
intrusion into any state’s legislative process or commandeering of any
state’s executive branch. This Note will leave a more sophisticated Tenth

Id.
See Chemerinsky, supra note 115, at 877 (arguing that Congress would run into serious
problems if it acted to command a state to adopt any certain legislation).
227
501 U.S 452, 452 (1991).
228
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 145 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 935–36 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
229
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 1 (2005) (holding that provisions of the Controlled
Substances Act, which criminalized the manufacture, distribution, or possession of
marijuana for interstate growers and users of marijuana for medical purposes, does not
violate the Commerce Clause); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that
42 U.S.C. § 13981—a federal civil remedy for victims of gender related violence—cannot
stand under either the Commerce Clause or section five of the Fourteenth Amendment);
New York, 505 U.S. at 185–86 (holding that the Commerce Clause precluded a Guarantee
Clause claim).
230
See PRINCIPLES, supra note 136, at 312–26 (recounting the history of Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence). The Court has taken two approaches to Tenth Amendment jurisprudence
that are inconsistent. Id. at 313.
231
See id. at 326 (“[I]t will take many years and further decisions for the Supreme Court
to clarify the content of the new federalism which has emerged in the past decade.”).
232
See id. (noting that current Tenth Amendment jurisprudence may allow congressional
prohibitions on state conduct so long as Congress does not affirmatively mandate state
action).
225
226
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Amendment analysis for another writer, and instead turn to Article IV’s
guarantee of republican government.233
Assuming, once again, the juxtaposition of two evenly matched
constitutional provisions—Article II, which establishes the Electoral
College, and the Compact Clause—this Note contends that the
Guarantee Clause should be the determinative factor, thus ensuring the
constitutionality of the NPV.234 In recent years the Court has flirted with
the Guarantee Clause by invoking its name in several cases concerning
federalism, but the Court’s fidelity to the Tenth Amendment has
prevented the Court from relying on the Guarantee Clause in any of its
holdings.235 What exactly would an argument in defense of the
constitutionality of the NPV pursuant to the Guarantee Clause look like
if presented before the Supreme Court? The following Contribution
outlines such an argument.
IV. CONTRIBUTION
The Guarantee Clause has not been employed by the Supreme Court
in nearly one hundred years. Thus, it is expected that the Court would
approach use of the Guarantee Clause with trepidation. This Part seeks
to allay such fears. The Contribution posits that the Guarantee Clause is
perfectly applicable to the exceptionally unique legal circumstances
presented by a Compact Clause challenge to states enacting the NPV
pursuant to their Article II powers. In concluding that the Guarantee
Clause should be implicated in a constitutional challenge to state
legislative adoption of the NPV, the Contribution will evoke the clause’s
highly relevant historical narrative as a foundation.236 Next, the
Contribution will offer a policy argument in favor of applying the
Guarantee Clause in the unique situation explored by this Note pitting
Article II against the Compact Clause.237 Finally, this Part will conclude

See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
235
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 183–84 (1992) (stating that because a
provision in question was invalidated under the Tenth Amendment, there was no need for
the Court to evaluate the same provision in light of the Guarantee Clause); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1991) (discussing the importance for states to determine the
qualifications of their government officials underneath both the Tenth Amendment and the
Guarantee Clause); see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S 98, 141 (2000) (Ginsberg, J. dissenting) (“In
light of the constitutional guarantee to States of a ‘Republican Form of Government,’ U.S.
Const. Art. IV, § 4, Article II can hardly be read to invite this Court to disrupt a State’s
republican regime.”).
236
See infra Part IV.A.
237
See infra Part IV.B.
233
234
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with the legal argument in support of activating this clause, which has
been inactive for almost a century.238
A. Important Historical Considerations for the Guarantee Clause
The Guarantee Clause has been called a “sleeping giant,” but the
import of the clause was very much awake with meaning over two
hundred years ago.239 The view that the Guarantee Clause protects
states from undue interference by Congress is embodied in the
ratification of the National Constitution. James Madison remarked that
the drafters of the Constitution created a draft that was “nothing but a
dead letter” until the state ratification conventions breathed life and
validity into it.240 In the state ratification conventions, concerns about
growing federal power leading to only nominally sovereign states were
placated by explicit reference to the Guarantee Clause.241
When this giant was put to sleep, it was for practical and very
circumstantial, if not far-sighted, reasons and has remained asleep
because, like any good giant, it is powerful.242 Justice Taney’s 1849
opinion in Luther has influenced Guarantee Clause jurisprudence to this
day, thus imbuing some importance into the extra-legal factors framing
his decision.243 Practical considerations shaped his opinion more than
“immutable principles embedded in the Constitution[;]” specifically, if
Justice Taney had ruled otherwise, seven years of government activity
would have been completely nullified.244
B. Policy Rationale for Use of the Guarantee Clause in This Unique Situation
As a sleeping giant, the Guarantee Clause should not be stirred
recklessly. However, utilizing the Guarantee Clause to reinforce that
See infra Part IV.C.
WIECEK, supra note 12, at 290 (quoting Charles Sumner); see supra note 108 (outlining
the various causes that have elicited legal support from the Guarantee Clause).
240
RAKOVE, supra note 20, at 17.
241
See supra notes 120–24 and accompanying text (discussing concerns by the states about
growing federal power).
242
WIECEK, supra note 12, at 295; see also Feeley, supra note 108, at 1436 (listing a variety of
causes for which the Guarantee Clause has been invoked).
243
See WIECEK, supra note 12, at 118 (stating that Justice Taney’s rationale has continuing
pertinence).
244
Id. at 120. Taney’s opinion also considered the Domestic Violence clause and the 1792
Militia Act—an exercise of legislative power—which had given power to the President
when facing rebellions. Id. at 85. Rebellions in 1798, 1832, and 1838 handled by the
Domestic Violence Act (as articulated through the 1792 Militia Act) gave credence to
Taney’s use of the Guarantee Clause as derivative of the need to maintain peace and
tranquility. Id.; see also Merritt, supra note 108, at 79 (recounting the facts of Luther v.
Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849)).
238
239
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which was given exclusively to the states does not open a Pandora’s box.
No interstate compact has ever dealt with election law and few compacts
as provocative are visible on the horizon. There are no floodgates to
open by use of the Clause in these circumstances.
While the Court in Luther v. Borden understood “United States” to
mean “Congress” in striking down a Guarantee Clause challenge so that
Congress was charged with guaranteeing to states a republican
government, this is not the same as the contemporary understanding of
“United States.”245 The “United States” denotes the three co-equal
branches of government.246 One interpretation of the Guarantee Clause
provides that it prevents most federal intervention in a state’s affairs.247
This interpretation works only if the “United States” is thought of as
three co-equal branches balancing and checking each other.248 Thus, if
Congress overreached by interfering with the federal scheme—if
Congress decided to commandeer state officials or attempted to control
state legislation so as to determine how that state could choose its
electors, for example a presidential elector—the United States through
the Supreme Court would be charged with protecting the state’s
fundamental republican nature.249 If Congress were to successfully
interfere, then state legislators would no longer be responsive to their
constituents as required in republican government, but instead to an
outside agency: the federal government.250
Further, even a narrower approach to the Guarantee Clause, one that
sees it as merely concerned with monarchy and aristocracy, would still
be implicated by congressional interference with state NPV legislation.
This is because in a monarchy
citizens do not get to choose their rulers, power is fixed
and inherited; in a republican form of government, the
people ultimately retain sovereignty and choose their
officeholders. In other words, the key features of a

WIECEK, supra note 12, at 301.
Id.
247
Id. at 294.
248
Id. at 301.
249
C.f. Printz v United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that under the Tenth
Amendment, the federal government cannot take control of a state’s chief enforcement
officers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that Congress cannot
legislate for state legislatures).
250
See Merritt, supra note 108, at 41 (explicating that in republican government, states
have control over their internal governmental machinery).
245
246
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republican form of government are a right to vote and a
right to political participation.251
It could be argued that the two chief political parties in the United
States have hereditary powers and a stranglehold on the entire political
process, but nowhere in the National Constitution is there a mandate for
a two-party political system.252 The only caveat to the otherwise absolute
plenary power states have regarding holding popular elections—equal
protection in the political process, as mandated by the Fourteenth
Amendment and subsequent amendments—is perfectly in line with the
notion that the Guarantee Clause is primarily about the right of the
individual to political participation.253 It is not states qua states that are
protected from congressional overreach, but the living, breathing people
residing in the states.254 Deborah Jones Merritt quips that “the citizens of
a state cannot operate a republican government, ‘choos[ing] their own
officials’ and ‘enact[ing] their own laws,’ if their government is beholden
to Washington.”255 For the Court not to rule would mean that Congress
or the President is left to enforce and/or interpret the Guarantee Clause.
However, the “members of Congress [may] have a direct personal
interest implicated.”256
It is viable to consider that just as policy considerations carry little
weight regarding a state’s plenary power to appoint under Article II,
there is little room for policy considerations about the Guarantee
Clause’s protection of the independence of state governments. As
Merritt has noted, “[t]he only ‘policy determination’ demanded . . . is
that states should maintain a ‘separate and independent existence.’ That
policy decision, however, has already been made by the Constitution.”257
C. The Legal Argument for Use of the Guarantee Clause
By utilizing Justice O’Connor’s criteria for the Guarantee Clause,
announced in New York v. United States, application of the clause to the
conflict between Article II and the Compact Clause will not
Chemerinsky, supra note 115, at 868 (footnote omitted).
See generally U.S. CONST. (indicating nowhere the requirement of a two-party system).
253
Chemerinsky, supra note 115, at 868.
254
See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the people . . . .”); see also WIECEK, supra note 12, at 301
(“Most Americans no longer consider the states to be anthropomorphic entities capable of
having rights or enjoying the benefits of the guarantee [of a republican form of
government].”).
255
Merritt, supra note 108, at 25 (quoting in part from THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James
Madison)).
256
Chemerinsky, supra note 115, at 876.
257
Merritt, supra note 108, at 76.
251
252
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unnecessarily extend the scope of the clause into dangerous territory.
Her two-part conjunctive test posited that the federal government
violates the Guarantee Clause if states lose their ability to set their
legislative agendas and if state government officials can no longer
remain accountable to the local electorate.258
Any interference in a state legislative process by the federal
government is potentially a violation of a state’s sovereignty and the
principle of federalism itself, unless the federal government is carrying
out a constitutionally specified task.259 The very ideal of federalism is
protected by the plenary power given states in Article II.260 This is
because Article II is a part of the constitutional scheme, whereby states
are assured a role in the selection of the executive branch and they are
insured against Congress overreaching when states exercise their role in
the election of the executive and the legislative branches of the federal
government.261 The Court can reinforce this principle by affirming that
states have control over local elections, a key aspect of republican
government, and that constitutionally, popular elections for presidential
electors are local elections.262
Presidential electors are agents of the states, not of the federal
They are officers in fifty distinct representative
government.263
democracies—in republics. Control over state representatives is an
essential component of state sovereignty and republican government.264
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185–86 (1991).
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549–50 (1985). In this case,
the Court adopted the view that “the political process gives the states their primary
protection against destructive federal intrusions.” Merritt, supra note 108, at 1.
260
Merritt, supra note 108, at 1.
261
Id. at 14–15. States were given indirect influence over elections for the House. Id.
There is nothing indirect about their power over presidential elections. U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 1, par. 3.
262
See Merritt, supra note 108, at 38 (arguing that state control over local elections is
intrinsic to republican government).
263
Supra text accompanying note 22.
264
Merritt, supra note 108, at 36. Poignantly,
[c]ontrol over the franchise is a hallmark of republican government.
Montesquieu observed that “it is as important to regulate in a republic,
in what manner, by whom, to whom, and concerning what suffrages
are to be given, as it is in a monarchy to know who is the prince, and
after what manner he ought to govern.” James Madison echoed this
thought, declaring in The Federalist that “[t]he definition of the right of
suffrage is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of republican
government.” In order to establish a government responsive to its
electorate, a state must first define that electorate. The power to define
the franchise for a state and local elections, therefore, is one of the
powers that the guarantee clause originally reserved to the states.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
258
259
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The Court has shown extra deference in approaching state authority over
officers and legislatures.265 Congress cannot legislate for states or take
command of state officers, two components over which control is
necessary for a state exercising its Article II power. Explicitly, the Court
has said:
Just as “the Framers of the Constitution intended the
States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth
Amendment, the power to regulate elections,” [e]ach
State has the power to prescribe the qualifications of its
officers and the manner in which they shall be
chosen. . . . [O]fficers who participate directly in
the . . . execution . . . of broad public policy perform
functions that go to the heart of representative
government.266
As in Coyle v. Smith, a claim based on a congressionally imposed
limitation upon the power of the state should be actionable under the
Guarantee Clause.267 If a state loses its ability to set its legislative
agenda, including adopting principles of equal protection when its
citizens act in concert with citizens from other states to elect the
President, and if a state’s government officials can no longer remain
accountable to the local electorate (i.e., if state representatives are
impotent to execute the laws passed), and if this situation arises from
interference by the federal government, then there would be a violation
of the Guarantee Clause.268 More succinctly stated, a congressional
265
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot
utilize state officers for its own purposes); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188
(1992) (holding that federal legislation cannot be used to commandeer the state legislative
process).
266
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1991) (emphasis added) (citations omitted);
see also Merritt, supra note 108, at 50. “It is obviously essential to the independence of the
states . . . that their power to prescribe the qualifications of their own officers . . . should be
exclusive, and free from external interference, except so far as plainly provided by the
Constitution of the United States.” Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 570–71 (1900). The
Guarantee Clause does not protect states from federal infringement in determining
qualifications for all local officials, or even most state employees. See Merritt, supra note
108, at 52 (distinguishing a small number of state employees that promote the ends of
republican government).
267
See 221 U.S. 559, 568 (1911) (holding that Congress could not restrict Oklahoma’s
placement of its capitol).
268
See Merritt, supra note 108, at 23 (arguing that the Guarantee Clause protects states
from federal government interference); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 115, at 868 (arguing
that the Guarantee Clause protects individual liberties). If Merritt’s proposition that the
Guarantee Clause protects states from the Federal Government is true and if states attempt
to extend a policy of equal protection via the NPV, would individuals then have justiciable
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challenge to the NPV would implicate the Guarantee Clause because
Article II is power reserved for the states that cuts to the heart of
republican government.
V. CONCLUSION
It has been written by one of its detractors that the National Popular
Vote is intended to revolutionize the Electoral College.269 But consider
that “[Thomas] Jefferson said every generation needs its own
revolution.”270 Revolution need not mean a bloody overthrow of one’s
government. “Revolution” can mean “a very important change in the
way that people do things.”271 Change can occur within a constitutional
framework. See, for example, the Eleventh through Twenty-Seventh
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Change within a constitutional
framework does not require the amendment process, as demonstrated by
Marbury v. Madison, Shelly v. Kraemer, Brown v. Board of Education, the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, or President Lincoln’s Emancipation
Proclamation.272 What the author is contemplating here is Democracy as
an ongoing experiment, an experiment that requires education,
measured assessment, and a generation making its constitution its own
within the flexible framework offered to posterity by the Framers of the
Constitution. Strikingly, no revolution is needed in order for the NPV to
take effect because it operates completely within the framework of the
Constitution. It is not the Constitution that would bar the NPV. There
are no originalist arguments or policy arguments strong enough to
prevent Article II from working in unison with the Constitution’s
guarantee of a republican form of government. Only a blind adherence
to custom, fear, or the ill-intentioned self-interest of political incumbents
and their affiliates could stop the NPV once and if enough states have
ratified it. The result of finding the NPV unconstitutional would be a
pair of absurdities: first, state legislatures would be barred from fully
embracing the ideal of equal protection in choosing their electors; and
second, the only way to protect state sovereignty in the federal system
individual liberty claims against the federal government under Chemerinsky’s conception
of the Guarantee Clause?
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would be for Congress to legislate for states by mandating that they
cannot embrace equal protection. With the NPV and the guarantee of
state republics, the fiction of a leader of the free people could be made a
reality.
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